Towards the renewal of opposition politics in Zimbabwe: What is to be done? (Part 1)

Tags

leadership, opposition, Renewal, Zimbabwe

By Justice Alfred Mavedzenge

Introduction

At the center of Zimbabwe’s governance crisis is the toxic nature of the politics of both the ruling party and the opposition. In most of Zimbabwe’s political parties, politics is centered on advancing the interests of the individuals who are at the helm of the party and their families. Recently I watched a video where the former First lady, Mrs. Grace Mugabe was touring the construction site of the new African liberation museum in Harare. She was accompanied by persons whom she introduced as former President Robert Mugabe’s family members and these are Mr. Innocent Matibiri, Mr. Walter Chidhakwa and Mr. Leo Mugabe.

Mr Innocent Matibiri was a Deputy National Police Commissioner while Mr Walter Chidhakwa was Minister of Mines during the Mugabe administration. Both were quite incompetent in executing their duties. For me, the utterances of the former First lady in this video were a reminder of what is problematic with the Zimbabwean politics. From former President Robert Mugabe to the current administration of President Emmerson Mnangagwa, ZANU PF has continued to pursue politics that is centered on advancing the interests of individuals who are at the helm of the party, and their families. This kind of politics is anchored on ZANU PF’s “one center of power” doctrine. Under this doctrine, all the power is concentrated in whoever is the President and First Secretary of the party at that time, and his decisions cannot be challenged, including decisions to appoint incompetent relatives and friends into positions of power.   

In the opposition, the emergency of Nelson Chamisa in 2018 as the leader of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (and later the Citizen Coalition for Change) was also followed by the adoption of the “Chamisa Chete Chete” (translated to No-one but Nelson Chamisa is our leader) philosophy. This philosophy was later reinforced by the adoption of the “doctrine of strategic ambiguity” which Nelson Chamisa introduced purportedly to ensure that ZANU PF is kept unaware of the opposition party’s strategies. However, in reality the doctrine of strategic ambiguity became a cover for Nelson Chamisa and his inner circle to evade accountability for any of the major decisions they made on behalf of the party and the opposition movement. In essence, similar to the ZANU PF’s “one center of power doctrine”, Nelson Chamisa’s doctrine of strategic ambiguity (and the Chamisa chete chete philosophy) became a means of concentrating power in the party leader and shield the party leader from being held accountable. 

For the ruling party ZANU PF, this approach of individual centered politics has succeeded to keep the party in power, but it has not succeeded to bring about development to the nation. As a result, ZANU PF has been unable to address the challenges of poverty bedeviling the country since the 1990s, mainly due to government incompetence and corruption, which can be traced back to nepotism and absence of accountability. For the opposition, the individual centered politics has only but weakened the opposition and enabled ZANU PF to retain power. No single individual can succeed to remove a strong and vicious dictatorship such as ZANU PF.

There is a notion amongst some sections of the Zimbabwean population that Nelson Chamisa is anointed by God and he therefore can succeed to remove ZANU PF. While I do not subscribe to this notion, as a Christian I can see some evidence of God’s favour and grace upon Nelson Chamisa. However, there is no evidence even in biblical history, of a single person who succeeded to carryout God’s mission alone, especially where the removal of an oppressive system is concerned. Jesus Christ was anointed by God to bring salvation to the people, but he had to work with the 12 Apostles, amongst several others. Back in the Old Testament, Moses was anointed by God to lead the nation of Israel out of Egypt where they had endured slavery and oppression for about 450 years. Moses could not achieve his assignment without working with Aaron, Mirriam and Jethro. He also had to appoint leaders from amongst the Israelites to help him manage the people during the Exodus.

In contemporary human history, there is no evidence of an opposition leader who single handedly removed a dictatorship.  In 2021 in Zambia, the dictatorship of Edgar Lungu was removed as a result of the collective efforts of the church, civil society and the political actors led by now President Hakainde Hichilema. Similarly in Malawi in 2019, they succeeded to remove the dictatorship of Arthur Mutharika because they worked together collectively. The same can be said about South Africa’s struggle to end apartheid, and recent success by the Senegalese to stop former President Macky Sall from seeking a third term. How can the Zimbabwean opposition move towards the politics of collective effort? 

Renewal of leadership

The leadership of Zimbabwe’s opposition needs an overhaul. Since 1999 to date, Zimbabwe’s opposition has been led by individuals who belong to what I call “the class of 1999”, who founded the Movement for Democratic Change under Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda’s leadership. It is fair to describe the class of 1999 as the “Galácticos” of Zimbabwe’s opposition politics. In football circles, “galácticos” is a term that is used to refer to super stars who are exceptionally talented, expensive and world-famous football players. Under President Florentino Perez, Real Madrid (a Spanish football club) pursued what became to be known as the galácticos policy. This is a policy of assembling a team of football superstars.  However, this policy created problems for the club in the early 2000s when it was introduced. For example, between 2000 and 2006 the Real Madrid seriously underperformed, winning only 1 league title despite the exceptional individual talent amongst its players who included Zinadine Zidane, Raul, Ronaldo, David Beckham, Roberto Carlos and Louis Figo. The problem was that these individual players were unable to function as a team, even though they were superstars.  

One can draw parallels between Real Madrid’s galácticos of the early 2000s and the class of 1999 of the Zimbabwe opposition leaders, which included Morgan Tsvangirai, Gibson Sibanda, Grace Kwinjeh, Lucia Matibenga, Douglas Mwonzora, Nelson Chamisa, Tendai Biti, the late “Chairman” Isaac Matongo, Welshman Ncube, Job Sikhala, Prscilla Mushonga and the late Learnmore “Judah” Jongwe, to name just but a few. This generation of opposition leaders is immensely talented. They have amongst them, excellent community organizers, fundraisers, orators, sophisticated thinkers and exceptionally skilled administrators and communicators.

Through its trail blazing efforts and exceptional skills, the class of 1999 succeeded to push for certain critical democratic reforms, including the adoption of the 2013 Constitution and a variety of electoral reforms, which have been instrumental in mitigating against authoritarianism in Zimbabwe.  However, they failed to get the ultimate prize of unseating ZANU PF.  This generation has been terrible at working as a team, precisely because of their culture of individual centered politics. They are also strongly committed towards outshining each other, and this became their greatest undoing, notwithstanding their exceptional individual talents. This is why under Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC split several times, and under Nelson Chamisa, both the MDC and the Citizen Coalition for Change have all but collapsed.

These splits have been blamed on ZANU PF infiltration. It is true that ZANU PF has infiltrated the opposition, but such infiltration has been successful because of the failure by some of these talented opposition galacticos to work together as a team. There is no dictatorship that does not desire to infiltrate. However, when the opposition is bound together by a common sense of purpose, they become difficult to penetrate and infiltrate. In my view, the failure of this generation of opposition leaders to work as a team, and the politics of “the big man” are the main reasons for the splits in the opposition.  

The numerous splits have undermined unity and public confidence in the opposition. Of course, some of the individual leaders still enjoy popular support but insufficient to remove the ZANU PF dictatorship through elections in the near future.  In this context, the efforts to rebuild the opposition movement in Zimbabwe ought to avoid recycling the leadership of the class of 1999. Recycling these leaders will not inspire unity and public confidence. What is needed is fresh leadership that has the capacity to unite the masses of Zimbabwe across the traditional political, social and religious divides.  However, this does not mean that the class of 1999 can no longer serve any purpose. They have an immense responsibility to give advice, mentorship and general guidance as well as thought leadership to the new crop of opposition leaders. The class of 1999 has immense experience which the new crop of opposition leaders can tap into and utilise to build a stronger movement and give Zimbabweans a fighting chance for their freedom.  

A new approach to elections and organizing communities

The new Zimbabwe opposition movement needs to adopt a long-term strategy towards achieving electoral victory. At the minimum, they need a 10-year election strategy. The first phase of that strategy must involve renewing the leadership and the structures of the movement. In addition, competent community leaders (ambassadors) should be identified who will work within communities on a long-term basis to sell the vision of the movement to the people in their communities. These community leaders must be people who are genuinely connected to the communities they work in and should not be people who are outsiders to that community. They should be supported with resources, on a long-term basis to implement programs and activities which empower communities socially and economically, as a way of demonstrating that they are a genuine alternative to ZANU PF, but also as a way of providing genuine public service. The process of selecting such community leaders must be based on values that are not only democratic but meritocratic in nature, in order to ensure that the movement has ethical and technically competent ambassadors embedded in the local communities. From amongst these ambassadors, the movement will be able to identify some of the candidates who can contest in parliamentary elections and actually win those constituencies by large margins.

Some argue that it is impossible for the opposition to win because ZANU PF always rigs the elections. This is true but not entirely. Since the 1990s, we have had numerous cases where ZANU PF was defeated by individuals who stood as independent and opposition candidates, after having worked in their communities for a very long period of time. Some of these individuals were able to persuade some of the ZANU PF members to vote for them and thus, were able to divide the ZANU PF local support base. For example, in 2008, Professor Jonathan Moyo won the parliamentary seat of Tsholotsho North constituency, when he contested as an independent candidate, after his expulsion from ZANU PF. Another recent example is Temba Mliswa who won in Norton in 2016 as an independent candidate, contesting against ZANU PF. In 2008, Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF was defeated by the then opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai in the first round of the presidential election. Certainly, there is something the new opposition movement in Zimbabwe can learn from these examples and it is that, it’s possible to defeat ZANU PF in an election notwithstanding its manipulative tendencies. However, the opposition can only achieve such victories if they adopt a long-term approach of maximizing on working through ambassadors in communities.

What I am proposing here is a radical change from the current approach where the opposition’s parliamentary candidates attempt to win elections by reason of being associated with a particular national opposition leader. For example, in previous elections the main resource for the majority of the Citizens Coalition for Change candidates for their campaign in local constituencies was their association with Nelson Chamisa’s brand. Previously, the Movement for Democratic Change parliamentary candidates were canvassing for votes because “they were representing Morgan Tsvangirai” in the local communities. This is an ineffective strategy because it reinforces the “big man” syndrome while at the same time it does not give the opposition candidates any leverage to persuade the local ZANU PF members to vote for them.  

For these reasons, I am suggesting that the Zimbabwean opposition must stop relying on the brand of the national opposition leader to canvass for votes during elections. Rather the national opposition leader must rely on the work that has been done by local community leaders, to win the votes. In order to achieve this, the opposition must deploy all its resources towards supporting local community leaders/ambassadors to do projects and programs which uplift the lives of their local communities.

Of course, there will be attempts by the State to disrupt the work that is done by these community ambassadors. There will also be security risks. However, there are practical mitigatory solutions to these challenges which the thought leaders of the opposition movement can help to design and implement.

Renewing the value system

The opposition movement in Zimbabwe needs to renew its values. Because of the one center of power philosophy and absence of internal democracy, the current opposition movement has too many people within its leadership ranks who are seeking power as a way of self-actualization, while others rely on opposition politics to access resources for personal gain. The massive levels of corruption taking place in opposition led municipalities bear testimony to this. The embezzlement of party funds by some of the leaders is further evidence of this challenge. With such people in positions of leadership, there is no way such a leadership can function as a team or transform the movement into a strong organisation that is capable of defeating ZANU PF in elections. Therefore, the opposition is not only in need of new leaders but a new value system. There is need for a leadership team (at all levels of the movement) which is able to instill amongst its workers and members, the values of patriotism, selfless service, accountability and meritocracy. Opposition politics should not be perceived as an avenue for the elite in society to self-actualize or for the unemployed to gain access to resources. Opposition politics, in the context of Zimbabwe, should be perceived as a self-less sacrifice to rescue the country and complete the agenda of the liberation struggle, which was to free the country from the shackles of oppression.

Conclusion

In the next instalments, I will address the other crucial elements which are needed in order to reposition Zimbabwe’s opposition politics and encourage its transition from individual centered politics to people centered opposition politics of collective responsibility. In this installment, I am suggesting the renewal of the opposition leadership, approach and its values, as a starting point. It is not so much about “who” will lead the opposition campaign during elections in 2028 but “what kind of an organisation or movement should be established first”. The face of the opposition in Zimbabwe should not be an individual but the work that is done to build communities by ambassadors for change. The idea that Zimbabweans must suffer so that they can vote ZANU PF out of power is not only unpatriotic but is ineffective. The opposition should demonstrate, through community developmental work, and practising the values of accountability that they are a better alternative to ZANU PF. 

This article has been written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge, a constitutional lawyer and Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public Law at the University of Cape Town. He writes in his personal capacity.

When some animals are more equal than others: Understanding Zimbabwean Journalist Blessed Mhlanga’s agony fo bail

Tags

crime, history, law, news, politics

Written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge-A Zimbabwean democrat and a comparative constitutional law scholar

1. Introduction 

In his song “Mubikira/Victimisation” Zimbabwe’s legendary musician Leonard Zhakata laments the way the law is applied in society. He says “mutemo wekwedu uyu wakanyangara, wakarerekera divi rimwe…mhosva imwe chete inosiyaniswa zvichinanga nekuti wabuda mumba mani….Vakasununguka vana vevamwe miromo yavo yakatandavara”. Dear reader, if you have few minutes, listen to the song before you proceed reading this article. The artist is basically saying, the way the law is applied is problematic. He says the law is enforced fairly or unfairly depending on the status of the accused person. He also says, blessed are the children of the ruling elite for they are free to exercise their freedom of expression and still be protected by the law.

Zimbabwe has a fairly democratic constitution which guarantees a range of civil liberties and the independence of courts so that they can protect these liberties. Jamaican singer Buju Banton, in his song ‘Not an Easy Road’ says “And many see the glamour and the glitter so them [sic] think a bed of rose, mi say Who feels it knows, oooh. Lord help me sustain these blows.” The lyrics by both artists-Leonard Zhakata and Buju Banton-capture the situation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. While many in the world may see the glittering Constitution of Zimbabwe, on the other hand Zimbabweans know that their Constitution has just become a façade to hide a vicious dictatorship that operates behind it.    

On 12 March 2025, Zimbabwean top journalist Blessed Mhlanga appeared before Judge Gibson Mandaza of the High Court of Zimbabwe, appealing against Magistrate Farai Gwitima’s decision to deny him bail. Mhlanga is facing two counts of contravening Section 164 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act which criminalises transmitting data messages that incite violence or damage to property. The allegations arise from the interview which Blessed Mhlanga conducted with a group of liberation war veterans who expressed their disapproval of the proposal to extend President Mnangagwa’s current term to 2030. In one of the interviews, the liberation war veterans called for President Mnangagwa to be removed from government because (in their view) he has not only failed to combat corruption but has been corrupt himself. The recording of the interview was published by Heart and Soul TV- a private media company which Blessed Mhlanga works for as a journalist. Amongst a myriad of challenges, he has faced so far, in his quest for bail include delays by the Magistrate in delivering judgment on his bail application, and an indefinite postponement by Judge Gibson Mandaza (of the High Court) of the hearing over his appeal for bail. The Judge has said he needs more time to review evidence that has been tendered by Blessed Mhlanga’s defence lawyers. The legitimacy of these delays is being questioned by many. Not so much for the reasons that have been advanced by the courts, but because of the context within which the bail proceedings are being conducted. Public trust in the judiciary is very low. Only 22,2% of respondents interviewed by Afrobarometer in its latest survey said they trust the courts of law ‘a lot’.  There are several reasons why public trust in the courts is said to be low but one of the driving forces for low public confidence is the way bail applications have been handled by the courts.

2. Bail in Zimbabwe

All constitutional democracies are based on the principle that an accused person must be presumed to be innocent until they have been found guilty by an impartial and independent court. This is the “presumption of innocence” principle. Its purpose, amongst others, is to ensure that accused persons are not exposed to prejudices as a result of any allegations leveled against them. Crucially, the presumption of innocence is meant to protect accused persons from being unfairly deprived of their liberty just because they face criminal charges.

Under section 50(1) (d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, “Any person who is arrested—

(d) must be released unconditionally or on reasonable conditions, pending a charge or trial, unless there are compelling reasons justifying their continued detention”. Therefore, the Constitution guarantees the right to bail for all accused persons. What this means is that, when arrested an accused person can apply to the relevant court for release from detention (on bail), pending their trial.  The court may deny this right only on account of reasons that are legitimate in an open and democratic system based on values including equality and freedom. It is the party opposing bail which must demonstrate these reasons. For example, the court may deny bail for an accused person if evidence has been tendered and the court is satisfied on the basis of the tendered evidence that the accused person is likely: to endanger public safety, endanger the safety of another person, commit similar offence, evade (abscond) from trial, interfere with witnesses or destroy evidence, if they are released on bail.

Whilst the law on the right to bail is very clear on paper, its application in Zimbabwe has been very problematic. This is what has created anxiety over the way Blessed Mhlanga’s bail application has been handled so far. 

3. Some of the ugly trends in the way the right to bail has been applied

Blessed Mhlanga’s lawyers have argued that it is in the interests of justice that their client (Blessed Mhlanga) be granted bail so that he can attend trial while outside of pre-trial detention. They have argued that the State has not produced any evidence which can validly cause the court to deny Blessed Mhlanga’s right to bail.

There is an emerging pattern in the manner in which courts in Zimbabwe are dealing with applications for bail particularly by accused persons who are considered to be influential critics of government.

First, it seems that bail applications by those who are not considered to be influential critics or those who are considered to be allies of the government, are expeditiously determined by the courts. In her latest contribution to the Journal on Human Rights and Governance in Zimbabwe, legal scholar and lawyer Bianca Mahere, has highlighted some of the recent cases which suggest unequal treatment of bail applications.

One recent case is that of State v Wadyajena and Others, in which Justice Wadyajena was arrested and charged with fraud and money laundering involving US$5 834 000. Wadyajena is a ZANU PF Member of Parliament and a long-time ally of President Mnangagwa. Thus, he was (and still is) a high-profile person, and the charges he was facing were serious. Arrested on 16 August 2022, and despite the seriousness of the charges and that he is a high profile accused person, Wadyajena was granted bail on 19 August 2022, after spending only three nights in pretrial detention.

In granting the bail, Magistrate Mambanje [correctly] ruled that bail is a constitutional right and that the accused should enjoy their liberty before trial. The Magistrate also ruled that the State had not provided evidence in court to support the claim that the accused person (Wadyajena) would interfere with witnesses.

Another case is that of State v Henrietta Rushwaya, in which Ms Rushwaya was arrested in October 2020 while attempting to depart from Robert Mugabe International Airport in possession of 6kg of gold worth about US$ 330 000. At the time of her arrest, Rushwaya was President of Zimbabwe Miners’ Federation. She has strong ties with the ruling party, with some alleging that she is President Mnangagwa’s niece in accordance with Zimbabwean tradition. Rushwaya was denied bail by the Magistrate’s Court but was granted bail upon appeal at the High Court. She spent close to two months in pre- trial detention. In November 2023, after a full trail, she was convicted of the charges and was ordered to pay US$ 5000 in fine. She was also sentenced to 18 months imprisonment which, however, was suspended for three years on condition that she does not commit similar crime. Later in March 2024, Rushwaya was arrested again and charged with fraud involving US$1 million. She was granted bail by Magistrate Mambanje. In granting her bail, the Magistrate was not distracted by the accused’s position in society and recent past criminal conduct. 

Another case is that of State v Obadiah Moyo, in which Obadiah Moyo was charged for criminal abuse of office. Allegations were that Obadiah Moyo had illegally approved tenders worth US$60 million in the procurement of COVID-19 test kits and medical equipment.  Obadiah Moyo has strong links with the ruling party ZANU PF and was Minister of Health at the time of his arrest. He was arrested on Friday 19 June 2020, appeared in the Magistrate’s Court the next day on Saturday 20 June 2020 and was granted bail on same day, after spending only one night in pre-trial detention. The Court upheld Obadia Moyo’s right to bail despite that he was a high-profile person with capacity to interfere with investigations and that he was facing serious offense of undermining government efforts to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.

But the courts appear to be hesitant to grant bail where applicants are influential critics of the government, or they are opposition activists. A few examples of cases come to mind. In June 2022, Job Sikhala was arrested and charged for inciting public violence, amongst other charges. These charges arose from Sikhala having been outspoken and forthright in demanding a thorough investigation into the killing of his client, Moreblessing Ali. At the time of his arrest, Job Sikhala was a senior leader in the opposition Citizen Coalition for Change. He was also an opposition Member of Parliament, and he was the lawyer representing the family of an opposition activist (Moreblessing Ali) who had been found dead and was suspected to have been murdered by a ZANU PF activist. Job Sikhala was denied bail at the Magistrate’s Court. He made several appeals, including at the High Court but was denied bail. He spent 595 days in detention and was, at the end of the trial found not guilty on most of the charges made against him.

Earlier in 2021, the then opposition activist and youth leader Makomborero Haruzivishe was arrested and charged for inciting public violence, after he engaged in peaceful protests. He was denied bail by the Magistrate’s Court and his appeals for bail were denied. However, he eventually was granted bail after 10 month of pre-trial detention. Pro-democracy activist, Allan Moyo suffered a similar experience and eventually got bail after spending more than two months in pretrial detention. 

Journalist Hopewell Chin’ono and opposition activist Jacob Ngarivhume were arrested in July 2020 on allegations of promoting public violence, after they called for peaceful protests against government corruption. They applied for bail at the Magistrates’ Court, and they were denied. They made several appeals for bail in the superior courts but were denied. They were eventually granted bail in September 2020, after spending 44 days in pretrial detention.

When one examines the way the courts have dealt with bail applications by Obadiah Moyo, Wadyena and Ruswanya and compare with the ways the same courts have dealt with bail applications by Job sjikhala, Hopewell Chin o’no, Jacob Ngarubvune , Haruzivishe and others, it us clear that the justice system  itamed against thes because theyperceived as regime critics,    

4. Conclusion

Since colonial times, Africans have suffered arbitrary detentions as retribution for holding and expressing divergent political views. In Zimbabwe, despite adopting a progressive constitution in 2013, which recognises democratic principles-including the presumption of innocence-those perceived to be government critics continue to suffer state sponsored arbitrary detentions, as retribution. The hope of the victims of these injustices is that the courts can help to protect their liberty, including by enforcing the right to bail. A quick look at how the courts are handling the right to bail suggest unequal treatment of bail applications. It seems that, bail applications by those considered to be allies of the ruling party are expeditiously dealt with while those filed by accused persons who are perceived to be government critics suffer delays which results in pre-trial detentions that are as long as 595 days! This is the context within which journalist Blessed Mhlanga is fighting for his freedom. As Jamaican singer Buju Banton said in his song Not an Easy Road: “Who feels it knows, oooh”. Indeed, it is not an easy road for Blessed Mhlanga, his family and the media fraternity in Zimbabwe. But as Zimbabwean legendary musician Leonard Zhakata exhorts us in his song ‘Mubikira/Victimisation,’  “Wonyarara kusvika kupiko uchibatwa huyanga munyika yababa/for how long will you be silent?… Bvuma kufira kodzero yako/be prepared to die for your rights.”

The importance of defining the national question in the quest for a democratic breakthrough in Zimbabwe

Tags

democracy, National Question, politics, Zimbabwe

Written by Justice Mavedzenge-A Zimbabwean democrat and comparative constitutional law scholar

1. Introduction

Coined by radical socialist thinkers including Rosa Luxemburg, “national question” is a term that can sometimes be vague and can assume multiple interpretations in different socio-political contexts. However, at its basic level, “national question” is a term that is often used to crystallise and define a rallying point for the nation. Put differently, a national question is the mission of a nation expressed in the form of an all-encompassing yet specific question. The quest to answer that question becomes the rallying point for the entire nation.

A national question does not remain the same across generations of a single nation. As implied by Frantz Fanon, each generation must craft and answer its own generational (national) question, to address the contemporary socio-political problems. For example, the generation of liberation war veterans in Zimbabwe crafted the national question “toitoira sei nyika/llizwe lethu silithatha njani/how do we take back our country” in response to the problem of colonialism which confronted them at the time. This national question is aptly captured in the song Mbuya Nehanda where the writer says: “Mbuya Nehanda kufa vachitaura shuwa muti toitora sei nyika ino? Shoko rimwe ravakatiudza, tora gidi uzvitonge”

The national question ““toitoira sei nyika/llizwe lethu silithatha njani/how do we take back our country”, became the rallying point for this generation as it took up arms against the racist colonial regime in Zimbabwe. So powerful and enduring was this national question that even today when you listen to the song Mbuya Nehanda, you can feel the emotions of not just the lead singer but the generation described in the song. This question remained the pulse of the nation even as different leaders of the struggle came and went. This generation achieved political independence in 1980. Fast forward to the present moment. What is the national question in Zimbabwe? What is the pulse of the nation? It appears to me that personalities like President Emmerson Mnangagwa and opposition leader Nelson Chamisa are now regarded as the pulse of the nation by their followers. It seems to me that the single most important question for some of the comrades in the opposition and goverment is: “what does mukuru (the leader) want? They never model their behaviour around the national question. Rather they model their conduct around what they think the leader wants to hear.

2. Why do we need a national question?

In scholarship, the question about the national question has been discussed  by  some of Zimbabwe’s finest public intellectuals. Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s recent book chapter “The Zimbabwean National Question: Key Components and Unfinished Business”; Enoch Dumbutshena’s  “Zimbabwe Tragedy” and Brian Raftopolous’s “Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation” are amongst some of the ground breaking contributions you can find on this subject. Of note is Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s profound view of the “Zimbabwean national question as an encapsulation of the key issues that define or underpin citizens’ struggle for an inclusive, democratic and developed Zimbabwe.”

Thus, there have been scholarly engagement on this issue but  the challenge is that these conversations appear to have not permeated into our everyday political and social-economic engagements with the masses of Zimbabwe. We have ignored our scholars and that’s part of the reason we are in an unending quagmire.

Crafting a national question helps to build public consciousness on the nature of the problem afflicting the country. Just like a patient who has not yet been diagnosed by a competent medical practitioner, the patient can FEEL the problem but does not really KNOW the problem. This is the predicament which Zimbabwe as a nation finds itself in today. Most of us can FEEL the problem in the form of lack of access to basic social services like medication, lack of employment, torture, corruption, gender based violence and arrogance by politicians from both the incumbent regime and the so called opposition. But do we understand the nature of the problem afflicting our nation?

3. The unknown problem

I submit that, for far too long both the incumbent regime and the opposition have misled the people regarding the nature of the problem which confronts Zimbabwe today. For example, for quite a long time, Zimbabweans were made to believe that their  problem was President Robert Mugabe and once he is removed, their problems would be resolved. As a result, at its inception in the early 2000s the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)’s rallying point became “Mugabe must go!” Yet Mugabe was just a symptom of the problem. The leftists in the MDC insisted that the problem was a dictatorial capitalist system which Mugabe was fronting. But they lost the argument and their voice was overwhelmed and the MDC’s mantra became “Mugabe must go!”

As we all have come to realise, since the 2017 coup that removed Mugabe, Zimbabwe has sunk into deeper crises and new problems have emerged to haunt the country. Corruption has increased, repressive laws have remained in place while new ones have been added, and journalists are still being persecuted for exercising freedom of expression. Therefore, the removal of Mugabe did not solve the problem. Whilst Mugabe was part of the problem and must have been removed long back, the problem was (and remains) much deeper and complex. Because the problem has not been defined, the country is still suffering from lack of its consciousness. Put simply, whilst the public can feel the SYMPTOMS, they are yet to understand the DISEASE that is afflicting their nation.

Today, some believe that once ZANU PF is removed from power, then all the problems we have, including  corruption, unemployment and political intolerance, will be a thing of the past. Others argue that once President Mnangagwa leaves office, Zimbabwe will be on the road to recovery! These slogans are just a clever way (by politicians) of appealing to the emotions of the suffering masses, in order to secure personal political power.

The problem in Zimbabwe is not an individual nor is it a political party. As has been alluded by others including Nkosana Moyo, the problem is systemic and cultural. I would attempt to define the Zimbabwean problem as an autocratic system of governance that is based on a toxic political culture of intolerance and blind (cultistic) follower-ship of leadership at multiple levels of society. Without dismantling this system and transforming this toxic political culture, there is nothing that can substantively change in Zimbabwe. Yes, removing certain individuals and certain parties from government may be part of the process, but we must reflect deeply on the quality of people we are seeking to replace current leaders with. Have we identified the problem we want to address? Have we built a political alternative that is made up of people who are demonstrably committed to dismantling the existing system and create an environment where the political culture can be transformed towards tolerance? Do we have a political alternative that has people who are honest and humble enough to take responsibility for their mistakes?

Save for a few, the majority of the leaders in opposition are waiting for their turn to eat and rule. Nkosana Moyo and others said this a few years ago and they were right.  Most of the  opposition leaders have demonstrated their disdain for tolerance and criticism. Similar to the incumbent regime, their default response to criticism is to question the legitimacy of the critic rather than responding to the criticism itself. They hate accountability. They operate several ghost accounts on social media which they use to conduct cyber wars against those who dare criticise them. This is very much similar to how the incumbent ZANU PF deals with its internal and external critics. The only difference is that when necessary, ZANU PF will throw its critics in jail. The opposition is unable to do that because it does not have access to the coercive apparatus of the state, such as the police and prisons.

Just an anectode of a personal experience: On multiple occasions, and in response to articles  which I critise ZANU PF, the opposition leader Nelson Chamisa hypes me with all sorts of praises! However, when I criticise him, he sends me messages describing me using all manner of superlatives including that I am an evil person and that God will punish me! I am not the only critic he has sent these direct messages. Several people have informed me of how he has victimised them through such bullying and one day they may have the courage to speak about it publicly.

If the opposition is intolerant to criticism, who then are they opposing? In what way are they an opposition to ZANU PF, when their political attitudes towards opponents is similar to ZANU PF? It seems to me, therefore, that the current opposition, particularly the outfit led by Chamisa is in no way ideologically opposed to the incumbent ZANU PF. They will not dismantle the autocratic political system and the toxic cultist political culture of blind follower-ship. They are most likely to either maintain the current system or even reinforce it in ways we have seen Emerson Mnangagwa doing since he took power in 2017. The evidence is in the way they are currently behaving towards critics and the way they have been running their political organisations. I could talk about the way they have been mismanaging and corrupting local municipalities which they preside over,  but that is a story for another day.   

4. Which way Zimbabwe?

Let us not fool ourselves. Chamisa is not the problem and neither is Emerson Mnangagwa. They are part of the problem. The problem is an autocratic system of governance that is reinforced by a toxic political culture of intolerance and blind (cultistic) follower-ship of leadership at multiple levels of society. In order to resolve this problem, we need more than just a change of political guard in government. We need leaders (with a progressive value system) committed towards dismantling this autocratic system and transforming our political culture towards tolerance and public accountability. A genuine opposition should be using its influence and soft power to promote these values in tangible ways. It cannot be enough for opposition leaders to adopt rhetoric mantras of championing democracy when their deeds are clearly undemocratic. It is insufficient for the ruling party to adopt mantras such as “leaving no one behind” when they are only carrying their families forward while leaving the whole nation in abyss.

As Zimbabweans, we must reject the temptation to be forced to choose between two sides of the same (political) coin, if at all  we  desire to break out of the current quagmire. But it may be difficult for a significant portion of the public to understand this because we have not properly defined the problem that we are seeking to address. We have absolutely nothing substantive that unites us as a generation. Instead we are united by personalities. In the opposition they are united around Nelson Chamisa but no one questions what Chamisa represents. This is why the rallying slogan towards the 2023 general election was “Chamisa Chete Chete”. In ZANU PF they are united around ED Mnangagwa and this is why their current slogan is “2030, vaMnangagwa vanenge vachipo/in 2030 Emmerson Mnangagwa will still be in power”. No one in ZANU PF asks “varipo vachiitei/in power doing what?”

Until we start uniting around substantive ideas that answer the national question, we will never experience genuine change. If we are lucky we will see a few changes of personnel in government but this will not be followed by any substantive change that addresses corruption, unemployment and violence. For example, you cannot expect the problem of gender based violence to be addressed by a leader who is not committed to addressing the general environment of intolerance. Corruption cannot be addressed by a leader who hates being held accountable.

In this sense, we need to take a step back as a country and ask ourselves: What is the problem that we are seeking to address? Put differently, what is the national question? After dealing with this question, we then can look at whether we have the right personnel to address the problem we have identified. It is in this connection that I submit that facilitating the crafting of a national question is imperative for anyone who wants to champion genuine change in Zimbabwe. This will help move our politics away from personalities to ideas, and in the process we may begin to see people contesting ideas as opposed to personalities.               

Decoding and explaining the co-existence between Nelson Chamisa and ZANU PF in the Zimbabwean authoritarian context: A case of captured popular opposition leadership

Tags

chamisa, mnangagwa, politics, ZANU PF, Zimbabwe

Written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge–A Zimbabwean democrat and scholar of comparative constitutional law

1. Introduction

Zimbabwe is in dire straits. The incumbent regime has severely underperformed as evidenced by a crumbling economy and growing poverty. Government corruption is at the heart of the mess. At the same time, the country has what scholars have described as the weakest opposition in the history of the country. Although he is not leading any party (after abandoning his organisation), Nelson Chamisa is still widely regarded by many in Zimbabwe as the main opposition figure. Democrats and a significant part of the population still look up to him for leadership in their quest to liberate the country from ZANU PF autocracy. Chamisa’s influence permeates across generations, villages and towns but he has, astonishly, never used it to organise and agitate the masses to peacefully confront the regime. Why?

After his appointment as a Minister in the then Government of National Unity (2009-2013), Chamisa’s political character radically changed. As I will demonstrate in this article, prior to his involvement in the Government of National Unity (GNU), Chamisa was bold and would not hesitate to organise the masses and peacefully confront the ZANU PF regime, to hold it accountable for corruption and human rights violations. The Chamisa who emerged from the Government of National Unity is soft, selectively religious and painfully ineffectual. Despite his popularity, Chamisa has avoided leading from the front and has chosen to “fight” the regime through scripture. What could explain this new Chamisa who is radically different from the old Chamisa? For me, the answer is in the complex relationship between the opposition-Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and different factions of ZANU PF. This relationship remains understudied by scholars and therefore, a lot of my sources in this article are interviews and media articles. Since 2009, Chamisa has been in alliances with different factions of the ZANU PF regime, and that explains his inability to confront the regime.

2. Laying the theoretical premise

ZANU PF is a hegemonic regime. In their seminal article “Zimbabwe’s Long Agony”, Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure argue that  hegemonic regimes are different from other autocratic regimes because they maintain (on paper) formal democratic institutions (such as opposition parties) but they make sure that those institutions are ineffectual. Although Levitsky and Way characterise competitive authoritarianism as a different type of dictatorship, I am of the view that in most parts of Africa, competitive authoritarianism has emerged as a tool (rather than a type of autocracy) that is used by hegemonic regimes to remain in power through dictatorial means which however look democratic. Zimbabwe is a perfect example.  

A core feature of competitive authoritarianism is that the regime does not close all the channels for opposition participation in politics. The regime desperately needs to create a semblance of democracy and therefore, it allows the opposition to exist and compete for power. Occasionally, the regime allows the opposition to win some of the elections.

Historically, dictators used to control the opposition by infiltrating the opposition parties so that they receive information (in real time) about the opposition’s plans. Modern dictators are more creative and daring. In order to create a public perception of stiff democratic competition, these dictators need a popular opposition leader who regularly accompanies the incumbent to a façade of an election, where the incumbent regime renews its mandate to rule in an electoral environment “of stiff competition” by the opposition. In order to achieve this, the regime needs an opposition figure who meets certain minimum requirements.

The opposition leader must be a popular person with an appeal to the masses,  but lacks real leadership skills and is gullible. It is essential for the regime to be in collaboration with an opposition leader who is popular so that there can be a semblance of stiff democratic competition every five years, but without the regime losing power. Occasionally, the regime may persecute the opposition leader as a way of galvanising and maintaining public trust in that leader. The regime knows very well that when it comes to opposition politics the public usually supports those who are persecuted by the government.

In Zimbabwe, whenever a person gets persecuted by the regime, that person is likely to be trusted by the masses as a progressive leader. For example, despite his chequered track record of gross political intolerance, the masses sympathised with Emmerson Mnangagwa when he was routinely and publicly bashed by the then First Lady, Grace Mugabe at party rallies. Mnangagwa’s popularity grew exponentially, when he appeared to have been poisoned by members of the Mugabe’s G40 faction at a party rally. When Mugabe fired him from government in 2017 and targeted him for persecution, Mnangagwa went into exile and the masses fully aligned with him, politically. Similarly, political support for the trio of war veteran leaders-Christopher Mutsvangwa, Douglas Mahiya and Victor Matemadanda-grew dramatically amongst the public and Zimbabwean elites as a direct result of their persecution by Mugabe as retribution for supporting Mnangagwa. Mugabe’s persecution of Mnangagwa and the war veterans trio turned them into political heroes overnight and galvanised public political support for Mnangagwa’s bid to succeed Mugabe as the new regime leader.  Thus, there is always a direct relationship between victimisation of a political figure by the incumbent regime and public trust by the masses. The trust is rendered emotionally and without scrutinising the democratic and leadership credentials of the subject.  

Whilst, it is true that the regime uses coercive means to persecute those who threaten it, this is not always the case especially when one analyses the behaviour of competitive autocratic regimes. Sometimes the animosity between the incumbent regime and the opposition leader may be choreographed in order to disguise the underlying relationship of collaboration between the opposition leader and the regime.

The regime uses a cocktail of tools to capture and control the opposition leader, but the main tools are bribery and blackmail (in that order) or black mail and bribery. The order in which these tools are used depends on the qualities of the targeted opposition leader. However, it is of absolute importance to the regime that the process of establishing control over the opposition leader be performed through extremely covert ways. This makes it difficult for the masses to realise that the regime has captured the opposition leader upon whom they have pinned their hopes. This is where thought leadership by discerning public intellectuals becomes key. The intervention of progressive public intellectuals is absolutely necessary to help the masses scrutinise the behaviour of the opposition leader in order to establish whether he/she has been captured or not. In this way, public intellectuals become a serious threat to the regime. This is why under a competitive authoritarian regime, public intellectuals are often vilified and discredited as part of intimidating them from scrutinizing these issues. Intimidating public intellectuals is an old authoritarian habit which was employed from as way back as the era of Benito Mussolini in Italy.

Opposition leaders who have been captured by competitive authoritarian regimes do not behave the same as opposition leaders who have been captured by traditional dictators. For example, when captured by a traditional dictator, an opposition leader tends to openly praises the regime. However, when captured by a competitive authoritarian regime, the opposition leader’s role is to protect the regime while acting as if he or she is a serious threat to the regime. In other words, the opposition leader engages in what can be characterised as “performative oppositional politics”. This is key for the regime to remain in power while maintaining a semblance of an environment of democratic competition. Under a competitive authoritarian regime such as ZANU PF under Mnangagwa,  how can we know that the opposition leader has been captured to enable performative oppositional politics?

The following are some of the behavioural signs which show that the opposition leader has been captured and is now a client of the regime: (a) the opposition leader creatively sabotages the opposition’s organisational capacity; (b) the opposition leader avoids peaceful confrontation with the regime and resorts to subtle ways of pacifying the suffering masses; and (c) the opposition leader promotes a culture of intolerance for knowledge and ideas-what Professor Achille Mbembe recently described as “intellectual decline”.  

The above theory can be a helpful framework of thought for those interested in understanding the behaviour of Zimbabwe’s most popular yet ineffectual opposition leader-Nelson Chamisa. Before testing Chamisa’s behaviour against this theory, it is critical to first have a glimpse into the historical background of Nelson Chamisa, the opposition leader.

3. A glimpse into Chamisa’s early history as an MDC political activist and leader  

There is a marked difference between the contemporary Nelson “Nero, Mukomana” Chamisa and the historical Nelson “Wamba Dia Wamba” Chamisa. The historical Chamisa was maverick, bold and fearless. After completing his high school education at Victoria High School in Masvingo, Nelson Chamisa enrolled at the Harare Polytechnic College where he joined the revolutionary Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) . He played a crucial role in the formation of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, to the point that he was the party’s first Youth Wing Chair. During his tenure as Youth Wing Chair, Chamisa demonstrated sheer courage as he fearlessly organised and led the youths in peaceful protests against the vicious ZANU PF regime under Mugabe. Chamisa had no fear of being arrested, tortured or detained. He led the youthful democratic forces of the MDC from the front. For his courage, Nelson Chamisa was nicknamed “Wamba Dia Wamba”-a name associated with a popular leader of a rebel group in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the late 1990s. Later on he was nick named “King Cobra”, again as recognition by the MDC supporters for his courage in organising  and “biting” against the regime and his internal party opponents.

During those days, Nelson Chamisa  often exhibited excellent communication skills. In recognition of his courage and excellent political communication skills, the party appointed him as its spokesperson and legislator for Kuwadzana, following the death of the legendary Learnmore “Judah” Jongwe. For those who know this part of the MDC history, Jongwe’s tragic death left very big shoes to fill and the fact that the party chose Chamisa as Jongwe’s replacement was a tremendous vote of confidence in Chamisa’s abilities as a political communicator and organiser of the masses. Since his appointment as party spokesperson, Nelson Chamisa rose through the ranks of the party until he was appointed by Morgan Tsvangirai, as one of the three Vice Presidents of the MDC.

It is critical to note that Chamisa was suddenly “promoted” to the position of one of the three Vice Presidents of the party because Tsvangirai and the Lacoste faction of ZANU PF needed to neutralise his influence. At that time, ZANU PF was divided into two factions-G40 led by Mugabe and Lacoste led by Mnangagwa, and the two factions were embroiled in a competition to co-opt the opposition MDC as part of their strategies to topple each other. In particular, the Lacoste faction needed the support of the opposition MDC for the military coup they were planning, while G40 was hell bent on co-opting MDC in an attempt to politically isolate the Lacoste faction. In a sense, the MDC under Tsvangirai became a battle ground for control by the two factions of ZANU PF. Around 2016/17, Morgan Tsvangirai had aligned with the Lacoste Faction and had promised them his support in exchange for co-opting him into the government that would be formed after the coup. Part of Morgan Tsvangirai’s brief from the Lacoste faction of ZANU PF was to reunite all the factions of the MDC under him and then bring them to support the Lactose faction’s military coup against Mugabe. This is why Morgan Tsvangirai “all of a sudden” began in 2017 to engage with various leaders of MDC factions, including Prof Welshman Ncube and Tendai Biti to build the so called “one big opposition tent”. It is possible that at the time when they were invited to join the “big tent”, the MDC faction leaders may not have been aware of Morgan Tsvangirai’s ultimate objective-to unite the opposition behind the impending coup!

It is at this juncture that Chamisa was just about to jump ship to join the G40 faction of ZANU PF. Chamisa had long been recruited into the G40 faction when he was Minister of ICTs in the Government of National Unity of 2009-2013. He is reported to have attempted to smuggle transport cargo trucks into the country and those trucks were reportedly impounded by the state revenue authority. As a precondition for the release of the cargo trucks, Chamisa had to warm up to Robert Mugabe. Thus, the Mugabe regime blackmailed Chamisa into alliance with it.  The bro-romance between Mugabe and Chamisa grew so much that Mugabe began to praise Chamisa publicly while Chamisa would also do the same albeit secretly. For example, at one of the rallies, Mugabe described Chamisa as “Supersonic Minister”. It was unusual for Mugabe to praise any opposition cabinet Minister in the Government of National Unity. Mugabe was known for undermining opposition Cabinet Ministers in the Government of National Unity. Chamisa also began to praise Mugabe, albeit clandestinely. For example during a Cabinet meeting Chamisa wrote a note to the then ZANU PF National Commissar Mr Saviour Kasukuwere exalting Mugabe as the best leader Zimbabwe could ever have. The note was leaked and created controversy within the MDC party.  

The relationship between Mugabe and Chamisa grew so much that for several years, Chamisa was trusted by the Mugabe family to provide transport services to the Mugabe owned Gushungo dairy products company. It was unusual for opposition members to do business with ZANU PF or the State. In fact, private companies associated with the opposition were often targeted for persecution and attacks by the Mugabe regime. Tsvangirai grew weary of the Chamisa-Mugabe relationship. Tsvangirai attempted to recall Chamisa from government but Mugabe blocked him and protected Chamisa.

In an attempt to whittle down Chamisa’s influence in the MDC party, Tsvangirai supported Douglas Mwonzora in the elections for Secretary General at the party’s congress in 2014, and Chamisa lost those elections. Between 2014 and early 2017, Chamisa was isolated in the MDC party but still commanded significant support.  Around 2016/17, as discussed above Tsvangirai entered into a pact with the Lacoste faction of Mnangagwa to reunite the different factions of the MDC and bring them to support Mnangagwa’s bid to succeed Mugabe. Whilst this plan was in motion, both Tsvangirai and the Lacoste faction picked intelligence suggesting that Chamisa was about to join the G40 faction led by Mugabe in ZANU PF.

During this time, the G40 faction appeared strong and looked poised to succeed Mugabe. On the other hand, the MDC was very weak politically and Chamisa had long been marginalised in the MDC politics after losing the elections of party Secretary General at the 2014 party congress. Therefore, Chamisa was attracted to join G40 faction of ZANU PF because (on paper) that is where his political ambitions would be served better. After all, he had developed a cosy relationship with Mugabe who was not only the President of the country but the godfather of the G40 faction.  However, the MDC and Lacoste faction of Mnangagwa would suffer a huge political blow if Chamisa were to desert the MDC and join G40. That would seriously undermine the joint Tsvangirai and Lacoste’s program of uniting the opposition in preparation for Mnangagwa’s bid to succeed Mugabe through a “popularly supported” coup.

In an effort to prevent Chamisa from joining Mugabe’s G40 faction, the Lacoste faction of Mnangagwa advised Tsvangirai to appoint Chamisa as one of his three Vice Presidents. This proved to be a master stroke as Chamisa took the bait and when the coup happened in November 2017, Chamisa could only express individual disapproval of the coup but would be bound by the party to render support to the coup leaders. As was later witnessed in November 2017 during the coup, with all the MDC factions united under Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition supported the coup and this was instrumental for laundering the coup as a popular democratic ouster of Mugabe. However, not long after the coup, Tsvangirai died and Chamisa succeeded him as leader of the MDC Alliance.

4. Chamisa the leader of MDC Alliance and CCC

Upon taking over as the leader of the MDC Alliance, Chamisa immediately reconnected with the G40 faction which had been vanquished out of power through a military coup. Chamisa secured the G40 support ahead of the then impending general election of 2018. Mugabe and other G40 leaders publicly campaigned for him. However, the elections were rigged and Mnangagwa became President. Chamisa’s alliance with G40 dramatically fell apart for reasons which require a separate article. But one of those reasons seems to be the newly found alliance between ZANU OF under Mnangagwa and Chamisa. Perhaps, this is when the process of the Mnangagwa regime’s co-option of Chamisa succeeded.

In the run up towards the 2023 general elections, Chamisa exhibited behavioural traits which suggests that the competitive authoritarian regime under Mnangagwa had completely captured him. Remember the traits of an opposition leader captured by a competitive authoritarian regime include: a) the opposition leader creatively sabotages the opposition’s organisational capacity; (b) the opposition leader avoids peaceful confrontation with the regime; and (c) the opposition leader promotes a culture of intolerance for knowledge and ideas. I will now turn to discussing how  Chamisa has displayed these behavioural traits in very subtle ways that are consistent with an opposition leader who has been captured by a competitive authoritarian regime.

5. Sabotaging the opposition’s organisational capacity

When collaborating with competitive authoritarian regimes, captured opposition leaders are required by the regime to use creative ways of sabotaging the opposition. They must not use methods that are obvious because that will erode public trust in the opposition. They must sabotage the opposition through methods which (on paper) appear to be logical and politically justifiable.

In the lead towards the 2023 general elections,  Chamisa formed the Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) and this became the main opposition party which the majority of the suffering masses believed would be the vehicle to dislodge ZANU PF from power. Chamisa sabotaged the CCC by pursuing what he termed “strategic ambiguity”-an approach whereby Chamisa would not share his program of action with party supporters and leaders, arguing that he wanted to take the regime by surprise! Whilst this sounded sensible and appealing to many, this approach created confusion within the party and led to several party activists and leadership demobilising as they hardly knew what the party was planning to do in order to win the next elections that were due in August 2023. The elections eventually came and Chamisa did not take the regime by surprise as he had consistently promised.  Rather, it was the democrats, CCC cadres and the suffering masses who were taken by a surprise by Chamisa when they eventually realised that he had no tangible plan to counter election rigging by the regime, and ZANU PF had just successfully renewed its mandate to rule! Essentially and consistent with opposition leaders captured by competitive authoritarian regimes, instead of demanding electoral reforms or boycotting the elections, Chamisa led the masses into an election which he knew was not going to be free and fair. Instead  he promised the masses that he had a solid plan to counter ZANU PF rigging, and when pressed to share the plan with the other party leaders he would not disclose the plan because he needed to be strategically ambiguous!   

Secondly, Chamisa sabotaged the opposition CCC by excluding some of the party’s most talented leaders from contesting in the 2023 general elections. He did this by introducing an opaque party candidates selection process which was based on an unclear selection criteria, and designed to make Chamisa the final decision maker on who would be approved to contest as a candidate on behalf of the party. The results of that process was the exclusion of several of the party’s strongest leaders including Tendai Biti (Harare East), Settlement Chikwinya (Mbizo), Trevor Saruwako (Mutasa), Innocent Gonese (Mutare Central) and James Chidhakwa (Mabvuku). Some of them ended up withdrawing from the party selection process while some decided to fight it out and were excluded at the end of the process. As a result, the party presented a weak set of candidates when it confronted the regime in the 2024 elections. Clearly, the biggest beneficiary of the exclusion of CCC’s strongest candidates from the election was the ZANU PF regime itself!

Thirdly, Chamisa sabotaged the opposition CCC by dismantling the party structures and refusing to adopt a constitution  for the party. Chamisa presided over a party that had no structures and no constitution. He would argue that the structures and the constitution are in place but are confidential to avoid infiltration by the regime. To some extent, he succeeded to persuade a significant part of the public. However, not long after I warned that this was disastrous, the party crumbled and Chamisa dramatically jumped ship claiming that the party had been infiltrated by ZANU PF. He did not take any responsibility for what happened! The reality is that, by failing to establish party structures and a party constitution, Chamisa severely undermined the opposition CCC’s ability to organise the masses ahead of the 2023 elections. There is absolutely no way an opposition party could win an election without clear structures who organise the masses. By refusing to maintain a publicly known party constitution, Chamisa made it possible for anyone to claim leadership over the party as was eventually done by Sengezo Tshabangu. For those who are unfamiliar with Zimbabwean politics, Sengezo Tshabangu is a fellow who “out of the blue” declared himself Interim Secretary General of the CCC party and began to recall MPs from parliament who had refused to acknowledge him. In doing this, Tshabangu was backed by the State. This infuriated Chamisa, who was hoping that some structures of the State would protect him in return for the support he had given in the lead up to the 2023 elections. In protest, Chamisa packed his bags and left the party CCC.

Both Tshabangu and Chamisa are ZANU PF proxies but they appear to be aligned with rival factions of ZANU PF. Whilst the ZANU PF regime may have been in a collaborative alliance with Chamisa in the lead to the 2023 general election, a faction in ZANU PF which began to openly  campaign for President Mnangagwa to extend his term to 2030 did not trust Chamisa to support their agenda. They needed a short term replacement and they found one in Tshabangu. As what became clearer early this year and speaking as leader of the opposition CCC, Tshabangu declared his support for the extension of President Mnangagwa’s term to 2030. That is a story for further analysis in another article. For now, the point is that Chamisa deliberately weakened the opposition CCC in the lead to the 2023 general elections by refusing to establish party structures and a party  constitution and the biggest beneficiary for that was ZANU PF. 

Third, Chamisa sabotaged the opposition CCC by refusing to deploy and pay election party agents in all the polling stations despite having received funding to do so. In Zimbabwe, each election candidate has a right to deploy agents to monitor voting at polling stations, and CCC had adequate funding to do that. But alas, on voting day, the CCC did not have polling agents in nearly 50% of the country’s polling stations, and of those who were deployed very few were paid their allowances. Chamisa was the sole guardian of party funds and up to now, he has not accounted for the failure to deploy election agents. The failure to deploy election agents in all the polling stations cost the CCC’s ability to conduct parallel voter tabulation to counter the regime’s rigging of elections. As a result, at the conclusion of the election, CCC had no records of how voting had transpired in the majority of polling stations and this enabled ZANU PF to rig and emerge as the winner.

6. Avoiding confrontation with the regime

Under a competitive authoritarian regime, the major task for the captured opposition leader is to manage and pacify the masses to ensure that they do not confront the regime.  In order to achieve this, the opposition leader  is allowed by the regime to position himself or herself as a beacon of hope and uses his influence to control the way the masses engage with the regime, particularly how the public responds to the regime’s socio-economic vices such as corruption. Historically, dictators used to rely on religious leaders to pacify the masses by preaching messages of blind obedience to the government. Modern dictators rely on opposition leaders to preach the same message. On behalf of the regime, the opposition leader abuses scripture to pacify the masses who are otherwise enraged by the regime’s corruption. Nelson Chamisa’s behaviour is consistent with the behaviour of a captured opposition figures.

At a time when the masses are looking up to him (as their leader) to organise and lead them in a peaceful confrontation with the regime, he does not do that. Instead, he consistently dishes out carefully selected bible verses. A closer scrutiny of the type of scripture which he dishes out reveals that he is pushing one single message and that is: “All that Zimbabweans need is faith and as a reward for their faith God will soon deliver them from the ZANU PF regime.” He never preaches scriptures which encourage the masses to take action against. For example, he never preaches about James 2 v 14-16 which says faith without works is useless. Preaching such a verse would be a breach of the contractual agreement that he has with the ZANU PF regime-to pacify the masses. Like toddlers, and with Chamisa acting as the nursing parent, religion is now being used by the regime as a pacifier on the mouth of Zimbabweans.

Through these pacifying biblical messages, the ZANU PF regime and Chamisa have succeeded to convince a significant part of the public to disengage from any peaceful confrontation with the regime. A few times, some of the CCC supporters have revolted against Chamisa by engaging in some kind of peaceful confrontation with the regime.  In response and abusing his influence Chamisa has isolated those activists, and in some cases he has publicly castigated them. On the other hand, those activists have been targeted with severe persecution by ZANU PF. Without Chamisa’s solidarity they have been left to suffer in isolation and this has created a chilling effect on other activists who would have wanted to disregard Chamisa and engage in confrontation with the regime.

A case in point is that of former CCC Vice Chairperson Job Sikhala-which many are familiar with. But there are several other cases that are not talked about often, where Chamisa isolated activists as punishment for confronting the regime against his advice. The case of Makomborero Haruzivishe is a notable one. Haruzivishe peacefully confronted the regime and was arrested. He spent almost 12 months in pre-trial detention.  Whilst Chamisa cannot be blamed for the arrest and detention of Haruzivishe, Chamisa must carry the blame for refusing to use his influential position as the leader of the opposition to organise the masses to demand Haruzivishe’s freedom. By offering such solidarity to Makomborero Haruzivishe, Chamisa would have emboldened Zimbabwean young people to peacefully confront the regime.  This is what progressive opposition leaders, all of over the world do. In Senegal, and on several occasions the then opposition leader Ousmane Sonko led protests to pressure the vicious dictatorship of Macky Sall to release his supporters who had been placed in arbitrary detention. Chamisa should have used his status and influence as the popular opposition leader to organise and lead peaceful mass protests to demand Haruzivishe’s freedom and this would have put the regime under enough pressure to do so. Instead, Chamisa isolated Haruzivishe and left him to rot in jail.  When Haruzivishe was eventually released from prison, he left the country in frustration not just with the regime but his party’s leadership. Several other young supporters of the CCC left the country while others remained but disengaged from the party. By withholding his social capital, Chamisa tacitly enabled the regime to continue persecuting opposition activists who dare confront it. By selectively preaching passive scripture in response to Zimbabwe’s governance crisis, Chamisa has successfully nudged  Zimbabweans to disengage from politics and under Chamisa, the regime has become safer than it has been under any of the previous opposition leaders.

7. Promoting a culture of intolerance for knowledge  

Levitsky and Way identified elections, the media, judiciary and parliament as zones which modern dictators seek to control so that they can manipulate political competition in their favour. I would add that the academia and knowledge production economy  is another zone of contestation which the regime seeks to control. Public intellectuals can be dangerous to the regime if their analysis create consciousness amongst the masses. But public intellectuals can also be weaponised by the regime to produce ideas and propagate information which supports the regime’s evil deeds. We have seen this with Hitler’s rule in Germany, and Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe. Historically, dictators used to ban public intellectuals. For example, Mugabe forced the late Prof Shadrack Gutto to leave Zimbabwe as retribution for his intellectual work which exposed the regime’s autocratic tactics. However, unlike historical dictators like Hitler and Mugabe, modern competitive authoritarian dictators work with the opposition to promote a culture of intolerance for knowledge and ideas. This is essential for the maintenance of a two party system which ensures that the only opposition in place is the one already captured by the regime.

Opposition leaders who have been captured by the dictator often use methods that are similar to those deployed by the dictator to control knowledge and ideas. Contemporary dictators usually avoid banning public intellectuals as what used to be done by historical dictators (like Hitler, Mussolini and Mugabe). Instead, they harass and vilify them as a way of discouraging them from producing knowledge and information which undermines the regime’s interests. In Zimbabwe, the Mnangagwa regime uses bullies (varakashi) to insult and vilify dissenting voices including public intellectuals whose ideas are opposed to the regime. A case in point is that recently I wrote an article in which I pointed out that the Mnangagwa regime is persecuting voices of truth while amplifying voices of lies (as part of truth erosion) and this is why Blessed Mhlanga has been arrested for creating a platform where everyone can express their views, including those opposed to the regime. In an attempt to vilify me, a senior member of Mnangagwa’s government went on a tirade describing me as a “little scholar” of no significance, instead of engaging with the arguments presented in the article. This is how competitive authoritarian regimes operate.

An opposition that is captured by a competitive authoritarian regime often behaves the same way, because it is an extension of the regime. It mimics strategies and tactics employed by the regime to silence any voices that may want to criticise the opposition leader. Chamisa introduced what Prof Achille Mbembe has characterised as “era of intellectual decline” in the Zimbabwean opposition, by establishing and maintaining a network of volunteers whose role is to cyber bully anyone who dares to criticise Chamisa’s strategies. Under Morgan Tsvangirai, it was fairly possible to criticise party leadership. Similar to Mnangagwa, Chamisa cannot be criticised without one suffering retribution through vicious vilification and insults. This has created an atmosphere of fear in the opposition. Whilst Chamisa may have benefited from this, the biggest beneficiary of insulating Chamisa from criticism has been the Mnangagwa regime because when Chamisa is not scrutinised, his collaborative relationship with the regime remains intact and unexposed, and when the opposition is not criticised it cannot sharpen its strategies to become more effective in fighting the regime.

8. Conclusion

In his song titled “”Get up, Stand up”, Bob Marley said:

“It’s not all that glitter is gold, and half the story has never been told. So now you see the light. You stand up for your right….And I say most people think that great God will come from the sky, take away everything and make everybody feel high. But if you know what life is worth, you would look for yours on earth. So now you see the light. You stand up for your right!”

In his letter to Christian believers, Apostle James writers as follows in James 2:14-16:

“What good is it, dear brother and sisters, if you say you have faith but don’t show it by your actions? Can that kind of faith save you? …So you see, faith by itself isn’t enough. Unless it produces good deeds, it is dead and useless”

In order to break out of the current quagmire, as Zimbabweans we need to understand that “None but ourselves can liberate ourselves” and therefore, we must have the urgency to ACT peacefully against the regime. But we need a strong opposition leader who is capable of matching his/her faith with works. The faith must be accompanied by actions which (out of necessity) must include organising the masses and leading them from the front. Nelson Chamisa has demonstrated incapacity to match his faith with action and possibly, this is because he is in a collaborative relationship with the different factions of the ZANU PF regime. For that reason, until he receives a signal from within ZANU PF, he will never use his influence to galvanise the masses into action. Whilst some of us in the academia can provide this kind of analysis, there is need for someone to occupy the vacuum of leadership which exists in the opposition. But when the right person shows up, it’s important that Zimbabweans provide their support. None but ourselves!

Competitive authoritarianism in Zimbabwe and the legal persecution of journalist Blessed Mhlanga

Tags

democracy, media-freedoms, news, politics, Zimbabwe

Written by Dr Justice Alfred Mavedzenge-a legal scholar and constitutional law jurist who is Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public Law at the University of Cape Town.

Introduction

On 24 February 2025, prominent Zimbabwean journalist Blessed Mhlanga, who is known for promoting freedom of expression for all including those who are critical of the Zimbabwean government, was arrested on allegations of transmitting electronic data messages that incite public violence. The State alleges that Blessed Mhlanga contravened section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act by publishing his interviews which [the state alleges] carried messages that incite public violence.  Blessed Mhlanga is currently in detention after the Magistrate’s Court said it needs until Thursday 27 February 2025 to consider his application for bail.  What are the real motives and intentions of the state for arresting and detaining Blessed Mhlanga?

Historically, dictatorships have been characterised by the overthrowing of the democratic constitutional order or the abolishment of democratic institutions. For example, dictators have in the past suspended the Constitution, banned independent media or suspended elections. Since the end of cold war, the world has witnessed the rise of nuanced forms of dictatorship, which esteemed scholars Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way describe as “competitive authoritarian regimes”. Such authoritarian regimes maintain constitutional freedoms (on paper) but they use subtle and creative ways of undermining the same freedoms.

Therefore, unlike traditional dictators, contemporary dictators do not always ban constitutional freedoms, such as media freedoms. They keep these freedoms in place in order to maintain a public posture of a regime committed to democracy. Some of these dictators describe themselves as constitutionalists. This helps the regime avoid isolation by the international community and other critical stakeholders. However, in order to retain power in the face of stiff political opposition the regime uses creative ways of undermining constitutional freedoms. Such creative ways include bribing its critics as well as opposition leaders. When the critics refuse to be co-opted through bribes, the regime will persecute them.

In order to disguise the persecution of its critics, the regime uses a tactic which Amnesty International describes as “erosion of the truth” in their recent publication  Be Water which is based on The Groundtruth project’s Authoritarian Playbook. Erosion of truth refers to attempts by the regime to lie and create narratives that distort the truth and hides the regime’s vile activities. Eroding the truth is critical for the regime to maintain a positive public image and public trust.

Emmerson Mnangagwa the competitive authoritarianist

This theory of competitive authoritarianism best explains the way President Mnangagwa’s regime engages with its critics and political opponents, particularly the regime’s motives behind the arrest and detention of journalist Blessed Mhlanga. When he replaced former President Mugabe in 2017, President Mnangagwa styled himself as a constitutionalist and even said he is “as soft as a wool”. Even though he came to power through a coup in November 2017, he promised that he would uphold and adhere to democratic norms of governing. His government has symbolically maintained constitutional freedoms, including media freedoms which are guaranteed under article 61 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

However, under his government there have been attempts to co-opt journalists and owners of private media houses through bribes so that they would either slow down on criticizing the government or they would join others in singing praises for the government. Scholar Noah Kupeta has extensively discussed this in his recent academic article “Soft as wool? Media representations of the Zimbabwean president Emmerson Mnangagwa after the 2018 post-election violence”.

To some extent, the regime’s attempt to co-opt the media has succeeded because there are several privately owned media houses and social media bloggers who used to fiercely hold government accountable for corruption and other vices but have now become praise singers of the regime. However, some of the journalists have refused to be bribed and have continued to speak truth to power and hold government accountable where it is necessary. These journalists have now been targeted for persecution by the regime. Blessed Mhlanga belongs to this group of journalists who have refused to be co-opted through bribes.

Blessed Mhlanga comes from a very humble background, rising from being a street vendor selling newspapers to becoming a newsroom journalist and now an online television anchor with a huge digital following. His story resembles sheer passion for journalism and his determination to speak truth to power. Consistent with the behavior of competitive authoritarian regimes, the truth about Blessed Mhlanga’s entry into the media fraternity and his competence as a journalist is being eroded (distorted). Regime enablers are distorting Blessed Mhlanga’s journalism background by deliberately mischaracterising him as a mere street vendor who was catapulted into the newsroom. Their intention is to cast Blessed Mhlanga as an incompetent person who masquerades as a journalist and who should not be taken seriously. Through this mischaracterization, the regime hopes to divert public attention from its persecution of Blessed Mhlanga the journalist, as punishment for promoting the expression of views that are critical of the government. Why do I say so?

Blessed Mhlanga hosts an online television show which regularly features different kinds of guests discussing pertinent issues affecting Zimbabweans, including corruption and human rights violations. Corruption is rife in Zimbabwe and is responsible for the high levels of poverty in the country. In 2024, Zimbabwe was ranked 158 out of 193 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Reports, including by international media indicate that most of the corruption in Zimbabwe involves government officials or persons who are closely linked to the regime and is associated with government tenders. Though the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has issued a statement denying, there is some evidence to suggest that there is an ongoing process of privatizing one of the parastatals-  the People’s Own Savings Bank (POSB). This is a State-owned bank whose clients are mainly low-income Zimbabweans but has a massive asset base which includes buildings and other properties. There are concerns that the process of privatizing this bank will involve corruption, and the people will lose their assets.

In one of the recent interviews, Blessed Mhlanga hosted and interviewed Mr Jealous Mawarire who is also a journalist and a political commentator. During this interview, Mr Jealous Mawarire claimed that President Emmerson Mnangagwa is involved in a corrupt scheme which is aimed at enabling the takeover of the POSB by a bogus private investor. Jealous Mawarire produced a document which he said was a copy of a directive from President Mnangagwa’s office illegally instructing the government’s Attorney General to instruct the POSB board of directors to accept a proposal from an investor whose bid to purchase POSB had been rejected by the state regulatory body on the basis that the investor lacked credibility.

Immediately after this interview, an X account associated with the President’s Deputy Chief Secretary (Mr George Charamba) “tweeted” a veiled threat against Blessed Mhlanga for having carried out this interview. The post stated that “Ichi chePOSB chichamuzvimbira zvachose. Mark my words!!!!!!” This can be translated to “Blessed Mhlanga will pay heavily for this interview on POSB”. Mr Charamba is notorious for threatening government critics using his pseudo X accounts.

Consistent with the behavior of competitive authoritarian regimes, Blessed Mhlanga’s arrest and detention has been disguised by the regime as legitimate enforcement of criminal justice, yet the reality is that this is persecution by  judicial harassment, whereby the regime abuses the law and the justice system to harass and silence its critics by way of targeting them with trumped up criminal charges and detaining them for long period of time.

Blessed Mhlanga has been charged for transmitting electronic data messages that incite public violence. The regime alleges that he published interviews which carried messages that incite public violence. The legal basis for these charges is a vague and draconian law-section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act-which criminalizes the publication of data messages that incite public violence. The regime has arrested Blessed Mhlanga even when it knows that he is not the publisher of the channel that carried the interviews in question. The publisher and owner of the channel is a private corporate entity. However, the regime appears to be interested in persecuting Blessed Mhlanga and has ignored the fact that he is not a publisher of the channel.

The Zimbabwe regime has a notorious history of  abusing law and the courts to persecute its critics. A recent example is that of opposition leader Job Sikhala who was arrested and kept in detention for a long period of time. He was denied bail by the courts, only to be found innocent on most of the charges but after having spent nearly 600 days in detention.

Consistent with the behavior of competitive authoritarian regimes, the Mnangagwa government often uses “erosion of truth” as a tactic to disguise its persecution of critics. As I described earlier, erosion of truth means distorting the truth in order to create a narrative that is favorable to the regime’s interests. The arrest of Blessed Mhlanga should be seen in this light. One of the “truths” is that the regime has presided over corruption, yet the same regime claims to be a corruption buster!  In an attempt to “erode” the truth, the regime wants to silence voices which expose the truth about the crisis of corruption in Zimbabwe. Blessed Mhlanga has become one of the journalists who have refused co-option by the regime and has chosen to expose the truth and thus, he is being arrested as part of the regime’s project of shutting down the voices of truth. Through legal persecution against Blessed Mhlanga, the regime hopes to shut Blessed Mhlanga up but also hopes to intimidate other journalists from exposing the truth.

Conclusion

The arrest and continued detention of Blessed Mhlanga on what clearly appears to be vexatious and trumped-up criminal charges exposes the reality that President Emmerson Mnangagwa is presiding over a ruthless competitive authoritarian regime. This government must be seen for what it is – a special type of a dictatorship! Whilst President Mnangagwa’s government has maintained constitutional freedoms on paper, his government employs creative ways of subverting those freedoms. Through the legal persecution of Blessed Mhlanga (the journalist), the regime is carrying out a subtle but aggressive attack on the media which will have long term repercussions on the exercise of media freedoms in Zimbabwe, and eventually may erode the truth. Will the international media community and other professionals in Zimbabwe look away? Today the regime has put a journalist in jail. If the regime does not suffer any lawful costs for arresting and detaining a journalist, they will also come for other professionals in Zimbabwe who dare to speak truth to power. But more than anything else, Blessed Mhlanga needs the support of his media colleagues in Zimbabwe and abroad to campaign for his freedom by exposing the truth behind his arrest and continued detention. 

Electoral Democracy in Namibia under spotlight as Supreme Court deals with the 2024 Presidential Election Petition.

Tags

Elections, Electoral Jurisprudence, Namibia, news, politics, Presidential Election Petition, Supreme Court

Written by

Dr Justice Alfred Mavedzenge-Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public law at the University of Cape Town

1. Introduction

Following the controversial election of November 2024, the Electoral Commission of Namibia declared Ms Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah of the ruling party South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) as the winner of the presidential election. According to the results declared by the electoral commission, Ms Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah won 57% of the votes cast. These elections have been described as controversial because the Electoral Commission of Namibia failed to provide adequate ballot papers at various polling stations across the country, making it impossible for several Namibians to exercise their right to vote on the polling day.

2. Allegations of election rigging

The electoral management body’s bungling of the election sparked a huge debate with some alleging that the failure to provide adequate ballot papers at some polling stations was part of a deliberate plot to suppress opposition voters while others argue that these inefficiencies were innocent acts of incompetence on the part of  the Electoral Commission of Namibia.

The President of the Republic added to the controversy by handpicking 36 polling stations and extended the voting period at those polling stations by two more days, from the 29^th to the 30^th of November 2024. He made this decision in the absence of a specific law which expressly gives him the power to do so. While some have lauded the President’s intervention (to extend the voting period) as a necessary measure to protect the right to vote (following the electoral commission’s bungling of the polling day), some have criticised the President for acting unlawfully and with the intention to create conditions for the rigging of the election. The President is a member of the ruling party SWAPO.

Two arguments have been advanced to support the claim that the President’s decision to extend the voting period was aimed at rigging the election. First is that the President is accused of handpicking 36 polling stations and extended voting only at those polling stations. According to a report issued by the Electoral Commission of Namibia’s Chief Electoral and Referenda Officer, Mr Peter Shaama, in the 2024 election Namibia had 2521 polling stations. The criteria used by the President to handpick the 36 polling stations (out of the 2521) is unknown.  Given that the shortage of ballot papers was experienced in various other polling stations which were not part of the 36 polling stations selected by the President, the President ought to have provided a justification or criterion which guided him in selecting the 36 polling stations. Some argue that the President should have consulted the contesting candidates and political parties when selecting the polling stations to benefit from his decision to extend the voting period.    

The second criticism is that the President’s decision to extend the voting period was made after the election had already ended. This criticism arises from the fact that the President issued a Proclamation on the 28^th of November 2024 in the evening announcing the extension of the voting period, after polling had ended at 21:00hrs on the previous day of the 27^th of November 2024. Therefore, there is a gap of a full day between the end of the voting period on the 27^th of November 2024 and the announcement by the  President that he was extending voting at 36 selected polling stations.   

As expected, both the results and the integrity of this election are now being challenged before the courts. The outcome of the election of the members of the National Assembly is being challenged in the Electoral Court while the presidential election is being challenged in the Supreme Court.

3. The legal challenge against the presidential election

The petition in the Supreme Court has been brought by Dr Panduleni Itula-the leader of the main opposition party the Independent Patriots for Change (IPC)-who was a candidate in the 2024 presidential election. Another opposition party, the Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) also joined in the petition as an applicant. Respondents are the President of Namibia, the ruling party SWAPO and the Electoral Commission of Namibia. Amongst other remedies, the petitioners are seeking the nullification of the results of the presidential election and that the election be held afresh by an impartial and competent body. On the 10^th of February 2025, the Supreme Court of Namibia heard arguments on the presidential election petition. Judgment will be delivered on the 28^th of February 2024.  What are the main legal issues before the Court?

4. The key issues and arguments

The main contention in this petition is about the legality of the election itself. The petitioners’ argument is that the ECN failed to provide sufficient ballot papers on the polling day (27^th of November 2024) and thus, failed to facilitate the exercise of the right to vote for Namibians. The impact of the ECN’s failure to provide ballot papers was so widespread that the President had to “extend” voting by two days. Petitioners further argue that the President acted unlawfully when he “extended” the voting period at 36 selected polling stations because there is no law which empowers the President to extend the voting period, and there is no known criteria used by the President to select the 36 polling stations where voting would continue from the evening of the 28^th to the 30^th of November 2024. By so doing the President further compromised the integrity of the election which already had been undermined by ECN’s failure to provide sufficient ballot papers to several of polling stations across the country, so argue the petitioners.   

In response, the President argues that he is authorised under the Namibian law to extend the voting period. In making this submission the President is supported by the other respondents. The President has argued that the powers to extend the voting period is an implied power arising from section 64(1)(b) of the Electoral Act as read together with section 9 (1) of the Interpretation Proclamation Act of 1920. The petitioners say none of these legal provisions give the President the power to extend the voting period.

Section 64(1) (b) of the Electoral Act empowers the President to declare a polling date. The President exercised this power when he issued a proclamation declaring the 27^th of November 2024 as the polling day and prescribing that voting would take place between 7am and 21:00hrs on that day. There is no other provision in the law which expressly empowers the President to extend the voting period. Section 9 (1) of the Interpretation Proclamation Act states that: “When a law confers a power or imposes a duty then, unless the contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.”  Adopted by the colonial administration in 1920, the principal purpose of the Interpretation Proclamation Act was to provide guidance on how the laws adopted by the colonial administration should be interpreted. This Acts remains applicable in Namibia today, and serves the same purpose of providing guidance on how Namibian legislation is to be interpreted. The petitioners have argued that the President could invoke section 9 of the Interpretation Proclamation Act only if in the first place the Electoral Act or any other legislation gave him the power to extend the voting period. Put differently, it is the petitioners’ contention that in the absence of an expressly given power under the Electoral Act or any other law for the President to extend the voting period, section 9 of the Interpretation Proclamation Act is inapplicable.

The President and SWAPO have also argued that even if it were to be accepted that the President is not authorised to extend the voting period, his conduct did not have a substantial material impact on the results of the election and therefore, the Court should uphold the results of the election. The petitioners have counter-argued stating that the President’s unlawful extension of the voting period substantially undermined the integrity of the election including by compromising the security of the ballot as the voting continued illegally for an additional two days, after a break for a whole day on the 28^th of November 2024. It is the petitioners’ argument that the electoral management body dismally failed to run the election properly on the 27^th of November 2024 and the attempts by the President to “save” the election by extending the voting period at 36 selected polling stations could not cure the election but only further undermined the integrity of the election.  

5. Conclusion

This is an interesting legal case whose outcome will have consequences both in terms of shaping the Namibian political landscape as well as the development of electoral jurisprudence on the continent. In my recently published academic article “A Critical Review of Jurisprudence on the Adjudication of Presidential Election Petitions in Africa”,  I suggested that:

“the approach to be taken by courts when adjudicating election petitions should very much depend on the case that has been presented by the petitioner. Where the petitioner is alleging irregularities and is claiming that those irregularities affected the results of the election, the question that must be examined by the court is the extent to which the results were affected. Where the petitioner’s challenge is directed at the integrity of the election process, the question to be examined by the court should be the extent to which the integrity of the process was violated.”  

It will be interesting to see which approach the Supreme Court of Namibia takes in deciding this case. Namibia has been rated highly in recent surveys on the state of democracy, partly because the judiciary is often perceived by Namibians and the international community as independent and impartial. According to the Freedom in the World 2024 Report, Namibia is one of the four SADC countries rated as free.

A presidential election petition is a high stake case. Whilst it is inevitable that the decision of the Court will upset some and please some, it is the reasoning of the Court in arriving at its decision that will make the biggest difference between whether the Court will retain its high standing or it will join other judiciaries in the region who appear to have lost their credibility as institutions which the public can rely on to protect and advance constitutional democracy. So far, the Supreme Court of Namibia has handled this petition in a transparent manner by allowing the broadcasting and live-streaming of the hearing, thereby, making it possible for Namibians and the world to witness the proceedings in real time. During the proceedings, the judges treated all the parties fairly giving each of them equal time to present their arguments. The Chief Justice, Hon Peter Shivute was firm-insisting that the parties stick to the main issues and avoid side shows. This helped to maintain decorum during the proceedings in the Court.   

Zimbabwe: Postponing the next general election to extend Mnangagwa’s term will collapse government and create a constitutional crisis

Tags

africa, constitution, Constitutional Amendment, history, news, politics, President Mnangagwa, Term limits, Zimbabwe

Written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge- a Zimbabwean who is opposed to President Mnangagwa’s third term bid and is a constitutional lawyer and Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public Law at the University of Cape Town.

1. Introduction

President Mnangagwa is serving his last term, which ends on the 4^th of September 2028 according to the Constitution of Zimbabwe. There is a strong push from a well-resourced ZANU PF faction aligned to President Emmerson Mnangagwa, to extend his term to 2030 with some advocating that he should be given a full third term. No logical reason has been presented in support of the desire to extend President Mnangagwa’s term.

ZANU PF National Political Commissar, Mr Munyaradzi Machacha is reported to have said that his party plans to extend President Mnangagwa’s current term by postponing the general election from 2028 to 2030, through a constitutional amendment which does not require approval by Zimbabweans through a referendum. ZANU PF Chairperson for Harare Province Mr Godwills Masimirembwa further explained that the “proposed extension [of the President’s term] does not violate constitutional term limits as it only postpones elections to 2030 without altering the two term cap.” Is this legally possible? The short and direct answer to that question is NO! It is legally impossible to do so without creating a constitutional and legitimacy crisis of unprecedent propositions, with potential to plunge Zimbabwe into serious political instability and catastrophic repercussions on the SADC region.

2. The constitutional text

The term of office for Members of Parliament (MPs), the President and municipal councillors is constitutionally fixed at 5 years.  The timing of a general election for the President, MPs and councilors is governed by section 158 (1) of the Constitution, which states that “a general election must be held so that polling takes place not more than— (a) thirty days before the expiry of the five-year period specified in section 143.” 

Therefore, the next general election for the President, MPs and Councillors is due by the 4^th of September 2028. To postpone this election, parliament will need to amend both section 158 and section 328 (7) of the Constitution.  Let me explain why.

3. Postponement of the next general election without amending section 328 (7) will create a constitutional crisis

Ordinarily the amendment of section 158 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe does not require the holding of a national referendum provided the effect of the amendment is not to extend the term of office of the incumbent President, MPs and councillors. If an amendment of section 158 of the Constitution is aimed at postponing any other general election other than the next one, such an amendment must follow the procedures set out under section 328 (3)-(5) of the Constitution, which essentially requires the amendment bill to be supported by a minimum of two thirds majority of the members of each of the two legislative houses.  For example, if the current parliament decides to postpone the 2033 general election to 2035 by increasing the term of office of the President and Parliament from 5 to 7 years, they will introduce a constitutional bill to amend section 158 of the Constitution, and that bill shall not require approval by Zimbabweans through a national referendum. All it requires is adoption by at least two thirds majority of the members of each of the two legislative houses.

However, if the amendment of section 158 of the Constitution seeks to postpone the next general election (that is due in 2028), that amendment cannot benefit the incumbent President, MPs and councillors. Put differently, a constitutional amendment that is meant to postpone the next general election in Zimbabwe cannot be applied to elongate or extend the incumbency of the current President, MPs and councillors.  This is because, section 328 (7) of the Constitution states that:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an amendment to a term-limit provision, the effect of which is to extend the length of time that a person may hold or occupy any public office, does not apply in relation to any person who held or occupied that office, or an equivalent office, at any time before the amendment.”  

A constitutional amendment that postpones the 2028 general election naturally extends the length of the time that the incumbent President, MPs and councillors will occupy these offices. Therefore, such a constitutional amendment is in fact an amendment of a term limit which cannot be applied to benefit President Mnangagwa or current MPs by virtue of section 328 (7) of the Constitution. In fact, any constitutional amendment to postpone the next general election, that is not accompanied by an amendment of section 328(7) of the constitution will collapse government and create a constitutional crisis of unprecedented propositions. If ZANU PF amends section 158 to postpone the next general election to 2030, it means that when the term of the current government ends in September 2028, Zimbabwe will not have a government for two years until 2030. The only way this situation can be avoided is if the postponement of the next general election is also accompanied by a constitutional amendment of section 328(7) of the Constitution to allow the postponement to benefit the incumbent President, MPs and councillors. An amendment of section 328(7) requires approval by Zimbabweans through a national referendum by virtue of section 328(9) of the Constitution.

Therefore, it is constitutionally impossible to postpone the next general election as a way of extending President Mnangagwa’s term to 2030. Such a proposition is not only absurd but is a dangerous suggestion that could plunge Zimbabwe into a constitutional crisis that has never been witnessed anywhere in the history of modern democracies. Campaigning to implement such a proposition is in itself a serious national security threat.

4. Mnangagwa, the competitive authoritarianist

In an effort to analyse and explain the behaviours of modern autocrats and despots, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way developed the political science theory of “competitive authoritarianism.” The two esteemed scholars argue that the strategy of modern autocrats is to maintain democratic institutions and structures on paper but in practice, subvert democratic norms and standards. For example, contemporary dictators ritualistically hold elections regularly as required by the constitution, but those elections are rigged in favour of the incumbent. Contemporary dictators maintain constitutions which guarantee judicial independence, but they often find creative ways of controlling judges and courts. This type of authoritarianism is what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way call “competitive authoritarianism”. In his article “The Contemporary Crisis of Constitutional Democracy” Martin Loughlin describes such regimes as “defective democracies” where there is competition (often-through elections and deliberations in legal courts) but the competition is always deliberately skewed in favour of the incumbent.

President Mnangagwa is a competitive authoritarianist. This is what he meant  when he famously described himself as a “constitutionalist.” Why do I say this? President Mnangagwa succeeded former President Robert Mugabe through a military coup which, however, was carefully choregraphed as a peaceful and democratic transition demanded and driven by the popular will of Zimbabweans and conducted in compliance with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe in the case of Liberal Democrats v President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, held that the transition from Mugabe to Mnangagwa was constitutionally compliant. This is notwithstanding overwhelming evidence demonstrating that President Mugabe was forced to resign through a military coup, and thus, the transition could never be constitutionally compliant. In my academic article “The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court as a key site of struggle for human rights protection” I presented the argument that, consistent with competitive authoritarianism President Mnangagwa’s unconstitutional rise to power in 2017 was clothed with a veneer of constitutional legitimacy by the Constitutional Court through its decision in Liberal Democrats v President of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

President Mnangagwa’s reign, since he came to power in 2017 demonstrates firm commitment to competitive authoritarianism. For example, he advocated for the legal abolishment of death penalty, yet he has not done much to stop extra judicial killings of his political opponents. His government has maintained the constitutional right to protest but security agents have made sure that no one exercises that right. Instead of banning the opposition (like what other dictators who include Macky Sall of Senegal did), President Mnangagwa has chosen to infiltrate the opposition and now controls it. Poor leadership and lack of democracy in the opposition under Nelson Chamisa created extensive dissatisfaction and divisions amongst opposition members, and this catalysed Mnangagwa’s bid to take over the opposition.

Mnangagwa has said he will respect the constitutional term limits, but he has allowed his supporters and cabinet ministers to campaign for the extension of his term. Typical of competitive authoritarianists, the plan might be for Mnangagwa to appear as if he is being pressured by the citizens to extend his term when in fact it is him who wants the term to be extended.   Therefore, consistent with his style as a competitive authoritarianist, President Mnangagwa’s likely first option is to pursue a third term through means which appear on paper to be consistent with democracy. This is the only way he can claim legitimacy in the eyes of the regional and international community. A veneer of legitimacy will be necessary for him given the dynamic geopolitics both in the region and internationally. It is unlikely that, as a first option, Mnangagwa would pursue a third term through means that are brazenly unconstitutional and undemocratic. If Parliament amends section 158 of the Constitution to postpone the elections from 2028 to 2030 as suggested by ZANU PF and Mr Masimirembwa, Zimbabwe will not have a legitimate government from the 4^th of September 2028. The current President, MPs and councillors will be illegitimate office bearers if they attempt to remain in office beyond the 4^th of September 2028 unless Parliament also amends section 328(7) of the Constitution, and such an amendment must be ratified by Zimbabweans through a national referendum

5. Proposed way forward

My thesis is that Mnangagwa seeks to secure a third term through a constitutional coup which avoids a referendum, but which appear consistent with popular democracy. He may not afford to openly disregard the Constitution as that will create a legitimacy crisis which could make him more vulnerable politically. This is why I am still convinced that he is contemplating to secure a third term through temporary succession – a strategy fully explained in my previous article. Some analysts have counter argued that temporary succession is too risky for Mnangagwa. While I agree with that view, it should be noted that, of all the competitive authoritarianist options on the table, temporary succession appears the safest route for Mnangagwa’s third term bid. All other avenues will require ratification by Zimbabweans through a national referendum and Mnangagwa is unlikely to win that referendum. As already suggested by ZANU PF, the 3^rd term campaigners are working to avoid the referendum at all costs. An attempt to secure a third term through temporary succession appears to be more likely. However, i do not rule out other possibilities. I make the following propositions in defence of the Constitution:

1. Zimbabwean civil society, academics and political parties must urgently undertake a mission to sensitise the governments and citizens of SADC Member States (and the African Union), about ZANU PF’s sinister agenda to create a constitutional crisis in Zimbabwe. It must be made very clear to regional governments and citizens in the region and the continent that the impending constitutional crisis in Zimbabwe will have unprecedented repercussions on stability not only in Zimbabwe but the SADC region and thus, it is in the interest of the region to persuade President Mnangagwa to respect constitutional term limits and unequivocally call off the ongoing dangerous campaign to extend his term of office.
2. There is an urgent need to conduct mass peaceful protests within and outside of Zimbabwe to demonstrate Zimbabweans’ disapproval of ZANU PF’s bid to subvert the Constitution by extending President Mnangagwa’s term. Opposition leaders should lead from the front on this assignment!  
3. Zimbabwean media and civil society must exert maximum pressure on the Parliament by holding the MPs accountable for their actions regarding Mnangagwa’s third term bid. Given that the primary duty of Parliament is to protect the Constitution, MPs must be questioned to clarify and explain why they are said to be working on an amendment to postpone the next election without holding a referendum, as that would collapse government in 2028 and create a constitutional crisis.
4. Zimbabweans from across the political and social strata must unite to form a broad-based opposition movement that is competent to defeat Mnangagwa in the 2028 presidential election, should he decide to contest in that election. This might be the only way to stop Mnangagwa’s sinister third term bid and save the Constitution of Zimbabwe

Written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge- a Zimbabwean who is opposed to President Mnangagwa’s third term bid and is a constitutional lawyer and Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public Law at the University of Cape Town.  

The Zimbabwean opposition leadership question: Lessons from Senegal

Tags

bassirou-diomaye-faye, chamisa, leadership, opposition, ousmane-sonko, senegal, Zimbabwe

By Justice Alfred Mavedzenge

1. Introduction

Bedevilled by a persistent socio-economic crisis, and with no immediate solution in sight, as Zimbabweans we are justified to envy others who appear to have succeeded to turn around their fortunes. A few years back, we were envious of the Zambians when they succeeded to dislodge the dictatorship of (now former) President Edgar Lungu by electing the then opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema in 2021. In fact we have become envious of any country which goes through a leadership change regardless of whether the change is progressive or retrogressive. For instance, last year, we celebrated a military coup in Gabon, when then President Ali Bongo was toppled by a military junta, even though we know very well that military coups rarely result in the resolution of a governance crisis.

At the moment our attention is on Senegal where citizens have succeeded to stop their president from seeking a third term. In addition, they succeeded to elect a youthful opposition candidate (Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye) as their president. These are aspirations shared by many Zimbabweans given the legitimate suspicion that President Emmerson Mnangagwa may be tempted to seek a third term and or postpone the next (2028) elections to 2030.

It is a positive thing that, as a people, we are interested in how others are achieving change in their countries. Culturally, that is our nurture.  I am reminded of one of our indigenous proverbs which says “kugara nhaka huona dzavamwe” which means: in order to achieve our aspirations we must learn from others. However, the biggest question is whether we are learning the right lessons? What are some of the lessons which can be drawn from recent events in Senegal?  Is there any basis to learn anything from Senegal?

2. Is there basis for Zimbabweans to try and learn from Senegal?

2.1 Repressive political conditions

Mr Macky Sall became the President of Senegal after winning the 2012 elections. He became the 4^th President of the Republic since Senegal’s political independence from France in 1960. Unlike Zimbabwe, Senegal has for a long time been perceived as a fairly successful democracy. However, in the past 5 years, Senegal backslided into an autocracy with some significant similarities to Zimbabwe. A recent survey by Afro barometer shows that more than 50% of the Senegalese respondents felt that the country had been sliding into autocracy in the last 5 years. These sentiments were largely because of increased persecution of opposition leaders by the Senegalese state,  clamping down of independent media (including the closure of independent broadcasting stations), internet shutdowns and crackdown against peaceful  protests. According to Amnesty International, about 60 people were killed by security agents as part of the state’s crackdown against peaceful protests between March 2021 and February 2024.

Under former President Macky Sall’s government, the then popular opposition leader Ousmane Sonko was constantly subjected to arbitrary arrests, detention and was restricted from engaging in legitimate political activities. In 2023, Sonko’s political party (PASTEF) was dissolved by the State on allegations of having incited an insurrection.

Sonko was indicted on various criminal charges including undermining state security, disseminating false news and theft. He was subsequently disqualified from contesting in any future elections. Similarly in Zimbabwe, opposition leaders and activists face such persecution as has been witnessed in Senegal. Although the Zimbabwean government has not legally banned the main opposition party (as was done in Senegal), the State has capitalised on the weaknesses of the main opposition party (Citizen Coalition for Change) to decimate it, forcing its leader Nelson Chamisa to quit. 

2.2 Attempts by the incumbent to seek a third term

Former President Macky Sall of Senegal attempted to run for a third term, notwithstanding restrictions imposed by the Senegalese Constitution. In a similar fashion to what is happening in Zimbabwe where President Mnangagwa’s supporters are urging him to seek a third term in violation of the Zimbabwean Constitution, former President Macky Sall’s supporters publicly urged him to seek a third term. He never gave Senegalese a clear, unequivocal response when he was initially asked whether or not he was going to seek a third term. Similarly, until recently when he promised that his government will not change the Constitution, President Mnangagwa and ZANU PF have been coy about the third term bid.

3. Recent events in Senegal

In 2023, former President Macky Sall was forced to abandon his third term aspirations when he made a public announcement in which he declared that he would not contest in the 2024 elections.  Earlier in 2012, Senegalese citizens had successfully stopped another of their Presidents (Abdoulaye Wade) from seeking a third term, when they united and overwhelmingly voted for Macky Sall, the then-opposition candidate.

After abandoning his third term bid, former President Macky Sall attempted to prolong his tenure by postponing elections. Presumably, this was part of his attempt to buy more time in order to identify a preferred successor whom he could support in the elections. In Senegal, candidates for presidential elections are approved by the Constitutional Council. President Macky Sall’s preferred candidate was not approved by the Constitutional Council on account of failure to meet one of the eligibility requirements.

Using its majority in Parliament, former President Macky Sall’s party attempted to postpone the elections. On Monday 5 February 2024, Parliament passed a bill postponing the presidential election from February 2024 (as originally scheduled) to December 2024. This sparked widespread protests which resulted in several people being killed by the state security agents. The postponement of the elections was challenged through a petition filed before the Constitutional Council. The Constitutional Council ruled in favour of the petition, holding that the postponement was unconstitutional. It ordered the elections to be held as soon as is possible, without specifying a date. A follow up application was filed before the Constitutional Council requesting the Council to clarify the date for elections, and the Council ruled that the elections must be held prior to the end of March 2024 as per the constitutional deadline.

The election was subsequently held on 25 March 2024 in compliance with the ruling of the Constitutional Council and the Constitution. Mr Bassirou Diomaye Diakhar Faye won the elections by 54,28%, defeating the candidate of the then ruling coalition  Amadou Ba who garnered 35.79% of the total votes. Mr Bassirou Diomaye Faye has since taken over the reigns from Mr Macky Sall, as the President of the Republic. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has appointed Ousmane Sonko as his Prime Minister. As mentioned above, prior to the March election Ousmane Sonko was the most popular opposition leader who, however, had been disqualified from contesting in the elections, and he chose to endorse his colleague Bassirou Diomaye Faye.

The success of the Senegalese people to stop former President Macky Sall from seeking a third term, and their success to elect a youthful opposition leader as the President are attributable to the leadership capacity of the then opposition. The quality of the leadership they had in the opposition made a huge difference.  

4. Collective and self-less leadership

For quite some time, the face of the Senegalese opposition movement was Ousmane Sonko. However, Sonko did not concentrate power around himself as we have seen being done by Zimbabwean opposition leaders. Instead, Sonko collaborated with several others to build a broad based movement in pursuit of a common political agenda. When the State targeted Sonko and his party with harassment, the opposition movement survived the onslaught. For example, when Sonko and his party were disqualified from elections, the opposition movement remained intact and strong to the extent that it still managed to stop Macky Sall from seeking a third term and it succeeded to field a different candidate (Faye) and still win the elections. Upon being disqualified from contesting in the elections, Sonko selflessly “passed the ball” to  Faye by way of endorsing Faye’s candidature in the March 2024 elections. The endorsement consolidated (rather than split) the opposition vote, and this contributed immensely towards Faye’s victory over the ruling party’s candidate.

In her published work “Democracy in Senegal: A Case Study of Democratic Success in

Africa” Rachael Lambert attributes the success of democracy in Senegal to the “ability of different social leaders to find common ground”. This view is widely held by other scholars including John Esposito, Tamara Sonn and John Voll who wrote “Senegal: Democracy and the Postcolonial State”-a book chapter which examines the historical evolution of politics in Senegal. The culture of the Senegalese opposition to find common ground, at critical moments was recently exemplified by Sonko and Faye in the recent elections. Is this something possible to achieve in Zimbabwe under the current crop of leadership of the opposition?

Unlike Senegal’s Sonko who could work with Faye, Nelson Chamisa has shown that he is highly insecure with the idea of working side by side with other competent leaders. Unlike Sonko and Faye who were open to criticism, Nelson Chamisa perceives those who are critical of his leadership style as jealousy of him or ZANU PF enablers. Sadly, it is a view also shared by several Zimbabweans in the opposition. As a result, Nelson Chamisa has run his parties as if they are religious cults. The results have been quite costly not only for him but for Zimbabwe’s struggle for democratic breakthrough. For instance, even though the Senegalese government banned the then main opposition party (PASTEF) led by Sonko, they did not succeed to decimate the opposition. In Zimbabwe, the dismantling of Nelson Chamisa’s Citizen Coalition for Change has automatically led to the death of the opposition and the ruling party ZANU PF is now enjoying a free reign. In this sense, the difference between Senegal and Zimbabwe is that in Zimbabwe Chamisa became the opposition while in Senegal, Ousmane Sonko built an opposition movement.

5. Clear ideological grounding

Faye and Sonko mobilised the Senegalese people around a clear ideological stand point. They projected themselves as de-colonial leaders who are committed towards ending the French neo-colonial exploitation of Senegal. This allowed them to establish alliances with various interest groups within Senegal and in the diaspora.

The Zimbabwean opposition leadership space has persistently been occupied by personalities who are demagogues but with unclear ideological inclination, and as a result they have failed to establish the necessary alliances with critical stakeholders within and outside of Zimbabwe. For instance, even though he had a trade union background, the late opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai was not ideologically articulate and as a result he was very much untrusted amongst African leaders and some of the critical stakeholders within the Zimbabwean body politic. Consequently, Morgan Tsvangirai succeeded to galvanise support within the opposition circles but was largely unsuccessful in his efforts to establish alliances with those who traditionally support ZANU PF. However, in 2008 he succeeded to defeat President Robert Mugabe but he could not capture State power due to lack of support from critical domestic and regional leaders, partly because of lack of trust which is attributable to his ideological opaqueness.   

The current opposition leader Nelson Chamisa appears to have suffered the safe fate. He confuses religion with ideology. He forgets that, even though God may be in support of his candidature, God is not religious. God still expects his chosen leaders to use their wisdom to articulate a clear vision, and craft a path which those who support them can follow.

6. Courageous opposition leadership

The Senegalese opposition’s success in stopping former President Macky Sall’s third term bid and winning the March 2024 presidential election is attributed to the brave and courageous personality of its leadership. As the leader of the opposition, Ousmane Sonko always led from the front and demonstrated fearlessness. He led peaceful protests in the streets even though he knew he would be arrested and detained. His presence at the protests, alongside other leaders who include now President Faye inspired the Senegalese people to come out and express their disapproval of President Macky Sall’s third term bid, as well as the attempts to postpone elections. In fact, at the time the presidential election was held in March 2024, Mr Faye had just been released from prison after spending 11 months in jail. He had been arrested on charges of threatening state security after he protested against state capture of the judiciary. 

In Zimbabwe, the main opposition leader Nelson Chamisa does not lead from the front. He leads from social media handles. When he took over the leadership of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance in 2018, Nelson Chamisa vowed that he would lead peaceful protests from the front. Since then, he has only participated in one march where he became famous for doing push ups as a symbolic demonstration of courage but nothing further materialised. Some of the opposition leaders, who include Job Sikhala, Jacob Ngarivhume, Makomborero Haruzivishe, Joana Mamombe, Cecilia Chimbiri, Netsai Marova, Obey Sithole and others, engaged in peaceful protests and were detained and ended up in jail for very long periods of time. Job Sikhala, who was Deputy National Chairperson in Chamisa’s party spent 595 days in prison, while youth leader Makomborero Haruzivishe was jailed for a year . Unlike Faye or Sonko in Senegal, Nelson Chamisa did not organise or lead any protest to demand the freedom of his fellow comrades. In fact, he discouraged and distanced himself from groups of opposition supporters who attempted to organise peaceful protests as means of putting pressure on the State to release these leaders.  Without leaders who are capable of leading from the front, it is impossible for Zimbabweans to achieve what the Senegalese achieved under the leadership of Sonko and Faye.

7. Conclusion

The approach to opposition politics in Zimbabwe needs a major overhaul. There is a need to transition from building individual oriented groupings to establishing issue based movements. Zimbabweans need to look out for and support leaders who have clear ideological grounding capable of uniting people across the traditional political, social and religious divides. There is a need for opposition leaders who live and practice democratic values of consultation and accountability. Without these values it is impossible to build a movement capable of spearheading a democratic breakthrough.

This article has been written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge, a constitutional lawyer and Adjunct Senior Lecturer of Public Law at the University of Cape Town. He writes in his personal capacity.

Zimbabwe parliamentary recalls: Why citizens must critically reflect beyond the ZANU PF-CCC binary.

By Justice Alfred Mavedzenge, Twitter @Dr_JAMavedzenge

11 October 2023

Introduction

On 9 October 2023, the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe announced that 15 legislators elected to the National Assembly on the opposition Citizen for Coalition Change (CCC) party ticket, had been recalled from Parliament by their party CCC. This followed a letter written by a Mr Tshabangu, purporting to be the Interim Secretary General of CCC, and triggering section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution to recall 15 Members of Parliament (MPs), on purported grounds that they had ceased to be members of CCC.

Section 129 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (the Constitution) outlines various circumstances under which the tenure of an MP can be terminated. The same provisions apply when recalling a councilor (see section 278 of the Constitution). Section 129(1) (k) states that:

“The seat of a Member of Parliament becomes vacant if the Member has ceased to belong to the political party of which he or she was a member when elected to Parliament and the political party concerned, by written notice to the Speaker or the President of the Senate, as the case may be, has declared that the Member has ceased to belong to it”

Following the decision of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in 2020 in the case of MDC and Others vs Elias Mashavira and Others SC 56/20, we now know that the import of section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution is essentially that, upon receiving a written notice from the relevant political party, and upon being satisfied that the notice is a legitimate communication from the said political party, the Speaker of Parliament must oblige and remove the concerned MP from parliament.

Two letters before the Speaker of Parliament?  

On 3 October 2023 the Speaker of Parliament received a written notice from a Mr Tshabangu, claiming to be the Interim Secretary General of the CCC. Through this letter Mr Tshabangu purported to inform the Speaker that the CCC party was recalling 15 of its affiliated MPs on the basis that they “had ceased to be members of CCC party.” In response, Mr Chamisa’s Advisor, Advocate Thabani Mpofu, published on his X handle a letter which he says Mr Chamisa had sent earlier on 11 September 2023, to the Speaker of Parliament, advising the Speaker that any correspondence regarding CCC affiliated MPs shall come from his office as the Leader of CCC.

Who is the owner of this goblin?  

In the Zimbabwean context, goblins are known to be a despicable and evil phenomenon. These recalls are despicable and evil, precisely because they have huge social, political and economic ramifications on the electorate and the targeted CCC party as well as the concerned MPs. They

temper with the very core of the democratic process which is hinged on the people’s vote. Therefore, it is to be expected that a witch hunt has ensued in the CCC and the court of public opinion. Many are asking the question: Who is the force behind these recalls?

Others argue that the ruling party ZANU PF has engineered these recalls as part of its persecution of the opposition and as part of its attempt to secure a two thirds majority in Parliament. Others claim that the recalls are a result of a split in CCC, while some argue that these recalls are a result of poor management of party affairs by the leader of CCC, Mr Nelson Chamisa. My view is that it is too early to tell. The goblin (recalls) may have more than one owner. However, the ZANU PF party is definitely going to be the biggest beneficiary of these recalls, should they be successful.  

Would institutionalizing and democratizing the CCC party help?

I read something interesting from someone’s X handle. He operates under the X handle @Chofamba. He said “we build durawalls, install electric gates, locked doors and CCTV cameras to combat robbers. But that does not stop robbers from attacking us.” I would add and say, we all lock our doors when we go to sleep at night or when we go to church on Saturdays and Sundays. Does that make our homes immune from invasion by house breakers? No, it does not! House breakers will still attempt to break in. Sometimes we may even be forced to open our doors at gun point or knife point by robbers! Locking the doors and installing alarm systems are mitigatory measures against potential invasion by house breakers. For the avoidance of doubt, Mr Chamisa’s no structure and no constitution approach is NOT sorely responsible for the recalls. There are several factors at play here, which can be blamed. However, the recalls have been made far much easier because CCC as a party is naked without any constitution which defines its leaders, and which governs how leaders are appointed or elected.

In my previous article, I warned that:

“…..But there is something even more unstrategic about running CCC using the Wapusa Wapusa (secrecy) model. Being a secretive party of unelected people [leaders], it means that anyone can claim to represent the party precisely because there are no known structures or rules and no one (including Chamisa himself) can claim to be the legitimate leader. His [legal] claim over the CCC throne is as good as anyone’s [legal] claim because he has not been elected or appointed by anyone. It will not surprise me if any random group of people organize a “CCC congress” and purport to elect a new leadership which then will claim to be the legitimate party leadership with the right to receive State funds under the Political Parties Finance Act. Do not say I did not warn you!”

Previously in 2022, I wrote more than once cautioning that failure to institutionalize the party and failure to embrace collective leadership was going to breed palpable internal disgruntlement, an atmosphere of fear and this would most likely create a fertile ground for the party to split.  Some have counter-argued that having structures and a constitution would not make the CCC immune from ZANU PF’s desire to decimate the opposition party. To sustain their argument, they claim that despite having structures and a constitution, the MDC Alliance (predecessor to CCC) still suffered recalls in 2020. However, they seem to forget that the now late MDC T leader, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, had failed to follow due process in appointing Mr Nelson Chamisa as one of the additional Deputy Presidents of the Party. It is this loophole which was exploited to remove Mr Chamisa from his position as President of the MDC Alliance, and this triggered the recalls of the MDC Alliance MPs who had refused to recognise the “new” party leadership. Therefore, the MDC Alliance affiliated MPs were not exposed to recalls in 2020 because their party had structures and a party constitution. The MDC Alliance failed to manage its party’s leadership succession process (from Morgan Tsvangirai to Nelson Chamisa) in a way which complies with its own internal constitution, and this was exploited by the party’s opponents (who include but are not limited to ZANU PF), to recall ‘their’ MPs from Parliament.

I would argue that it was probably far harder for anyone to engineer recalls of MDC Alliance affiliated MPs than it is to recall MPs that are affiliated to CCC. Why do I say so? It took a long-drawn court battle before MDC Alliance MPs could be recalled. This battle started on 24 September 2018 and ended on 30 March 2020, with the unpopular Supreme Court judgment. First, there was a 2018 legal challenge against Mr Chamisa’s ascendancy to the MDC as an additional Vice President of the party. The legal challenge was that Mr Morgan Tsvangirai failed to observe due process when he appointed Mr Chamisa as an additional Vice President of the party. In one of its provisions, the (poorly amended) constitution of the MDC stipulated that Vice Presidents must be elected and not appointed. This battle took no less than a year and half. It was only after winning this legal battle that the recalls were done. What has it taken to initiate the recall of CCC affiliated MPs in 2023? It has only taken one (politically) little fella to write a letter to the Speaker of Parliament claiming that (a) he is the Interim Secretary General of the party, and (b) he is acting on behalf of the CCC to recall 15 MPs. The reason why it was harder and took longer for anyone to recall MPs from MDC Alliance was because the MDC Alliance was clothed with a defined leadership structure and governed by an internal party constitution. On the other hand, CCC is a naked entity where anyone can claim to be a leader of the party because there are no publicly known leadership structures or party internal rules which govern the assumption of leadership positions in CCC. This is a glaring area of vulnerability for the party and a grave political risk for the electorate, which must urgently be addressed.

What about ZANU PF?

There can never be any doubt on any reasonable person’s mind that ZANU PF wishes to see the opposition crumble. That is the essence and pre-occupation of any dictatorship in the world. It is nothing new. That has always been the attitude of ZANU PF towards its opponents. History has recorded how ZANU PF was hell bent on destroying previous opposition parties, including the Joshua Mqabuko Nyongolo Nkomo led Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU), Edgar Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Of course, over time ZANU PF has perfected its methods of infiltrating and decimating opposition. They capitalize on the failure by the opposition to put their house in order and their general clumsiness in managing their internal affairs. For instance, it is only after a Mr Tshabangu had written a letter to the Speaker of Parliament recalling 15 MPs and purporting to be the Interim Secretary General of CCC that the public got to know that Mr Chamisa had also written a letter to the Speaker on 11 September 2023, advising the Speaker that any correspondence regarding CCC affiliated MPs shall come from his office as the Leader of CCC. One wonders why Mr Chamisa’s office did not make this letter public as soon as it had been delivered to the Speaker’s office, considering that we have always known that there would be attempts to recall CCC affiliated MPs? Why did Mr Chamisa’s office have to wait until Mr Tshabangu delivered his letter to the Speaker, for them to inform the public that they had also written to the Speaker? Publishing the letter immediately after delivering it to the Speaker in September 2023 would have demonstrated to the public that CCC are being proactive in addressing the threats of “ZANU PF engineered” recalls of MPs and councilors.   

The second act of clumsiness is that the letter published on Mr Chamisa’s advisor, Advocate Thabani Mpofu’s X handle, purporting to be the letter sent to the Speaker on 11 September 2023 by Mr Chamisa does not bear a stamp of acknowledgement from the Speaker’s office, while the one written by Mr Tshabangu bears the stamp of acknowledgement. There is no doubt in the mind of the reasonable observer that Mr Tshabangu’s claim that he is the Interim Secretary General is bogus. In the court of public opinion, we know that CCC has one leader and that is Mr Chamisa. But on what legal grounds can one defend the legitimacy of Mr Chamisa’s purported letter to the Speaker when the letter does not bear a stamp of acknowledgement from the Speaker’s office? Any messenger who delivers official letters and documents knows that they must return with a stamped copy to prove that they have indeed delivered the letter. Is there a possibility that Mr Chamisa was played by his own messengers? Even if this might be the case, is there a possibility that Mr Chamisa’s advisors slept on the job by not checking if their messenger had returned with a stamped letter which in future can be used as evidence that Mr Chamisa notified the Speaker that all correspondence regarding the CCC affiliated MPs shall come from him?

The bigger picture

Whilst I appreciate that it is important to discuss and examine the forces behind this latest round of recalls, I am also of the view that there is a bigger conversation we need to have as a country yearning for democracy and good governance. We need to discuss the suitability of the powers given to political parties under our Constitution, to recall MPs and councilors, yet the same Constitution says legislative authority is derived from the people. If we are serious about building democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe, we need to debate this issue. Who do we want to be at the center of our constitutional democracy: the people or political parties?

In the paragraphs below, I contend that section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution [and its sister provision section 278(1)], which gives powers to political parties to recall MPs and councilors undermines the independence of the legislature, it undermines stability in the legislature, it facilitates corruption especially in local authorities and it drains the public purse to fund unnecessary large scale by elections.  I conclude the article by offering some recommendations on what can be done to address this challenge, from a law reform point of view.

Power to legislate is derived from the people, not political parties.

In a constitutional democracy, the power to recall (or withdraw) a representative from the legislature is an important mechanism which is meant to ensure that the electorate remains in control of their representatives, and that the representatives remain accountable to those they represent in the legislature. In section 3(2)(f), the Constitution states that “the principles of good governance, which bind the State and all its institutions and agencies of government at every level, include respect for the people of Zimbabwe, from whom the authority to govern is derived.” In addition, section 117(1) of the Constitution states that “The legislative authority of Zimbabwe is derived from the people and is vested in and exercised in accordance with this Constitution by the legislature”. Who are the people from whom the authority to legislate is derived from? It is none other than the electorate themselves. It is not political parties. This is not to say political parties do not matter.  In section 3(2)(a), the Constitution states that Zimbabwe is based on a multi-party democratic political system. This means that political parties are essential role players in our politics. Their role is to act as vehicles through which the people organize and campaign for their political causes. However, it is clear from the reading of the Constitution that when elected to a legislative body, members do not represent a political party. They represent a constituency. This is particularly very clear when one considers members of the National Assembly and local authority councilors. They represent people who live in defined geographic constituencies. For example, Hon Fadzayi Mahere is a member of Parliament for Mt Pleasant while Hon Tatenda Mavetera is a member of Parliament for Chikomba West. They do not represent political parties. The fact that our MPs are constantly referred to as ZANU PF Members of Parliament or CCC Members of Parliament is actually a misnomer. Unfortunately, this misnomer frames the way the public perceives and interacts with these MPs in the sense that the public perceives these MPs as representatives of political parties rather than the people. It is a misnomer which (to some extent) frames the way MPs and councilors perceive their role as representatives of political parties rather than representatives of the people who elected them. It is also a misnomer which enhances the wrong perception that political parties own the MPs and councilors.

Subjecting legislators to the dictatorship of political party leadership

Zimbabwean political parties (both the ruling and the opposition CCC) are far from being democratic organisations. They are autocratic in the way they function. Both ZANU PF and CCC are governed by a clique of very powerful individuals who dictate party positions and decisions. Although ZANU PF has a clearly defined structure and a constitution, in practice the party operates very much on the basis of command and control by the party leadership. On the other hand, CCC does not have a known structure and does not have a known constitution. Without these, it is unclear how decisions are made, who is consulted and how the leadership is held accountable and according to which rules.

Given the undemocratic nature of these political parties, it is dangerous to give them the power to recall MPs.  The Constitution envisages for Zimbabwe a government that is based on a separation of powers model. This is a model which divides governmental authority between the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. The purpose of separating these functions is to avoid concentrating powers within a single arm of the state, in order to mitigate against abuse of public power. Under the Separation of Powers model, each branch of the state is supposed to operate independent of the other in order to be able to perform oversight functions on other branches. In this context Parliament is supposed to operate independent of the executive so that the MPs can hold the members of the executive to account, as is mandated to them under section 119 of the Constitution. Yet, section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution subjects MPs to the control of the leadership of political parties. In most of the cases, the leader of the governing party is also the President of the State and appoints the members of the executive branch of government. This puts MPs (elected to parliament on the ruling party’s ticket) in a position where they cannot hold the executive to account in a robust manner, because the same members of the executive have the power to recall them in their capacity as party leaders.

MPs elected to Parliament on the opposition CCC party ticket are also in a similar dilemma. Their party does not have democratic structures and does not have internal rules. Therefore, they occupy their offices as MPs at the pleasure of their party leader. They cannot exercise their functions independent of the control of their party leadership out of fear of being recalled. Therefore, when there is a legislative issue to be decided upon, they care what their party leader thinks and not what the people from their constituencies need, even though the Constitution says their authority is derived from the people.

Corruption and good governance  

Section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution might be a facilitator for grand corruption, theft and poor service delivery especially in local councils and municipalities. Councilors exercise authority and make decisions with huge implications on the distribution and expenditure of public resources such as money and land. For example, they decide on budget priorities. They also seat in sub-committees which make procurement decisions, including the awarding of tenders and business contracts. When discharging these functions, they cannot do so independently and in the interests of their constituencies. This is because, in reality they hold their positions in council at the pleasure of their party leaders. They have no choice but to listen to what their party leaders want.

Instability in the legislature and wastage of public resources

By giving political parties the power to recall MPs, section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution makes the legislature and councils vulnerable to internal political party squabbles. As we have already witnessed in 2020 and now in 2023, whenever there are squabbles within political parties, the composition of parliament and local authorities is affected, as MPs are recalled as part of settling political scores. Whilst there are various perspectives on the forces behind the recall of MDC Alliance and CCC MPs in 2020 and 2023 respectively, what cannot be denied is that the recalls are linked to internal political party squabbles in the opposition, which ZANU PF may be engineering or may merely be taking advantage of. These recalls have implications on service delivery and representation of the electorate. Section 159 of the Constitution stipulates that by elections must be conducted within 90 days to fill the positions of recalled MPs and councilors. On paper, this means that the people in the affected constituencies could go for up to 90 days without representation in the national assembly and the local authorities. In practice, it could even take longer than that to hold a by election. For example, more than 20 MPs were recalled in early 2020. By elections were held more than a year and half later in March 2022, purportedly due to the COVID-19 restrictions. Therefore, for more than a year and half, the people in at least 20 constituencies were not represented in the legislature.

By elections are not cheap to conduct especially when they are several seats involved. The Zimbabwe Election Commission and other agencies of the state must fork out huge sums of public resources in order to conduct these by elections. For example, the by elections held in March 2020 costed nothing less than USD 100 million. This money could have been used for service delivery.   

Recommendations

Section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution creates a scenario where MPs and councilors hold their positions at the pleasure of the leader(s) of their political parties. This undermines their independence, constrains separation of powers and breeds corruption. Ideally, this provision needs to be amended. Various countries have adopted different models on how legislators can be recalled. Zimbabwe needs to adopt its own model which is consistent with her own realities and is consistent with her own version of the separation of powers. In light of the fact that the Constitution says legislative authority is derived from the people, it is only right and fair that the power to recall must be exercised by the people.

Alternatively, the legislators should consider enacting a law to regulate the implementation of section 129(1)(k) of the Constitution. Amongst other requirements, the law should stipulate a democratic process which must be complied with by the responsible political party before recalling an MP or councilor. For example, the law could stipulate that a request to recall an MP or councilor must be accompanied with a written resolution by the leadership of the party. This resolution must be adopted by the party leadership through a majority vote, and it must be accompanied by a minimum threshold of signatures signed by voters from the constituency represented by the MP or councilor concerned.    

This article has been written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge, in his personal capacity. He is a constitutional lawyer committed to the building of democracy in Zimbabwe and Africa. 

Why Zimbabweans must urgently reflect on the opposition leadership question

By Justice Alfred Mavedzenge

Introduction

Aphiwe is Wapusa’s daughter. Aphiwe has fallen terribly sick with a life-threatening ailment. Aphiwe had gone to visit her grandmother in Chirumanzu. The doctors at St Theresa hospital (Chirumanzu’s largest hospital) have tried their best to treat Aphiwe, but her health condition continues to deteriorate. Wapusa has to fetch her daughter and bring her to Harare where she can get better treatment. But all the roads from Harare to Chirumanzu are in a terrible state due to many years of government corruption and neglect which has resulted in poor infrastructure more generally. Wapusa must figure out how to get to Chirumanzu and rescue her daughter. She cannot continue to mourn about the poor state of the roads or government corruption. She has to devise practical ways of getting to Chirumanzu and rescue her daughter. Wapusa owns a Honda FIT. She has to ask herself whether the Honda FIT is technically competent to get her to Aphiwe in light of the rough terrain and terrible road network. Perhaps, she needs to seek help and get a four-wheel drive vehicle which is capable of taking her through the rough terrain and poor road network so that she can rescue her daughter Aphiwe?  She has made more than five (5) attempts and failed to reach St Theresa hospital in Chirumanzu.

Just like Wapusa, Zimbabweans are faced with a challenging situation where they have to devise practical lawful means to achieve a democratic breakthrough, within the existing limitations. Just like Wapusa who has to accept that her government is not going to renovate roads and level down the mountains to enable her to drive her Honda FIT to fetch her daughter, Zimbabweans must also acknowledge that ZANU PF is never going to reform itself out of power. It is highly unlikely that under ZANU PF rule, Zimbabweans will ever have elections that are free and fair.

Just like Wapusa who has to think critically on how she can travel over the rough terrain to fetch her beloved daughter, Zimbabweans must also reflect on how the much desired democratic breakthrough can be achieved under the existing autocratic conditions. Just like Wapusa who has to evaluate whether her car (the Honda FIT) is capable of taking her through the rough terrain, Zimbabweans are currently confronted with the question whether they have an opposition leader who is capable of leading them to a democratic breakthrough under the current autocratic conditions. This has become a national question particularly because of the manner in which the main opposition leader, Mr Chamisa has approached the August 2023 general election, and the way he has responded to the outcome of that election. A year before the 2023 general election, I wrote an article in which I warned that Zimbabweans were most likely to be heart broken and disappointed with the outcome of the then impending election in 2023. I cautioned that although millions are likely to vote for Mr Chamisa because he is the only option on the ballot paper, he (Mr Chamisa) does not have what it takes to lead Zimbabweans to dislodge ZANU PF, considering the existing autocratic political conditions. I further argued (in another article) that, Mr Chamisa had adopted a narcistic, fascistic and individualistic approach to the struggle at a time when the struggle required a collective approach, and this had severely weakened the opposition ahead of the crucial 2023 election. Yes, we cannot ignore the fact that the opposition is operating in a severely repressive environment. My point is that people can mourn all they want about that, but nothing will change until they decide to put in place a leadership (in opposition) which meets the demands of the existing political realities and moves the country forward. What is needed is a leadership that is capable of building a strong and united opposition movement which can wrestle power from ZANU PF, under the existing autocratic conditions. Therefore, a critical question which needs to be discussed is what kind of an opposition leader does the country need, given the realities of the existing autocratic political conditions? However, before making my submissions on this important question, there is a preliminary question  that must be addressed. This question  has arisen every time I have critiqued Mr Chamisa.

Blaming the victim?

Some have asked me this question: When I criticize Mr Chamisa, am I not blaming the victim? The answer to this question depends on who you identify as the victim in this situation. Whilst it is true that CCC has been on the receiving end of state repression, the victim is not Mr Chamisa himself. The victims are the foot soldiers within CCC who are being abducted, beaten, tortured and incarcerated. The victims are the families of these cadres who are left to fend for themselves when their bread winners are languishing in prison. Mr Chamisa remains safe in the background. I do not recall any moment that Mr Chamisa has led a single demonstration ever since he became CCC or MDC Alliance leader. The victims are the Members of Parliament and councilors of CCC who use their money to campaign during elections because Mr Chamisa has centralized the management of party funds and is not accountable to anyone on the use of those funds. The victims are these Members of Parliament and councilors who, after winning the elections (using personal funds), they remain vulnerable to being recalled from Parliament because Mr Chamisa has failed to create a solid institutionalized party. The victims are those officers of CCC who are deployed into certain positions and suddenly they are dumped by Mr Chamisa without any explanation because he is not accountable to anyone.  The victims are the masses of Zimbabwe who have pinned their hopes on Mr Chamisa that he will lead them into a prosperous future and yet he continues to betray them because of his narcissist approach to politics and his disdain for collective leadership. Therefore, by criticizing Mr Chamisa, I am not blaming the victim.  He is not the victim. I would argue that he is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the status quo.

Rather, through these articles I am urging the real victims (Zimbabweans) to understand that under Mr Chamisa they have now become locked in a strategic cul de sac which they need to untangle themselves from as a matter of urgency. Zimbabweans are now victims of both Mr Chamisa’s unstrategic leadership and ZANU PF’s strategic autocracy. The only way out of this strategic cul de sac is to activate their agency and think critically outside of this binary Chamisa-ZANU PF box! To achieve this, Zimbabweans must reflect on the kind of an opposition leader they need. I offer my thoughts below:     

A visionary

All leaders who successfully led their people through a large-scale political change or transformation process were visionaries.  A visionary is a leader who is able to articulate not only a vision of what they want to achieve but also how they will achieve that vision. This is why Warren Bennis, a renowned scholar on leadership once said, “leadership is the capacity to translate vision into reality.” In the struggle for a democratic breakthrough, Zimbabwe needs an opposition leader who is not only able to articulate the alternative policies which he or she will implement if they get into power, but who is able to articulate to the masses how he or she will lead them towards achieving a change of government in the first place.

Let us take for example, the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) was very clear on how they sought to conduct their struggle. Whilst they would not reveal the details of their strategies, they were able to inspire the nation through words and actions, towards a defined course of the struggle, at every given moment. It was their ability to steer the struggle in a defined direction which inspired the masses to support them through difficult and dark times. Do Zimbabweans know the course that Mr Chamisa is leading them in their quest for democratic change?

As far as I recall, he has never been able to answer that question beyond assuring the citizens that “God is in it!” When asked about whether his party had a solid plan to counter attempts to rig the 2023 elections, his response was that he was going to win against all odds because “God is in it!” When the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission declared ZANU PF’s Emmerson Mnangagwa as the winner of the 2023 election, Mr Chamisa rejected the outcome and he declared that there would be a SADC and United Nations scaffolded fresh election. But he was never able to articulate to Zimbabweans how he was going to lead them towards a SADC scaffolded fresh election. Now that it has become clear that there is no fresh election that is going to be held in Zimbabwe until 2028, Mr Chamisa is now calling for a political settlement but again, he is unable to articulate how he is going to lead the masses towards achieving that objective.

Zimbabweans have endured decades of socio-economic crisis, and they are up against an autocratic political system that appears to be enjoying a strong grip over the levers of the state. In such a context, what is needed is an opposition leader who is capable of inspiring the masses to dream again and to inspire them into action. The one thing that can inspire the masses to believe again that change is possible is if they have a leader who is capable of leading them towards a particular course of action. There is nothing wrong with using religious mantra as a way of mobilizing certain constituencies. But certain religious mantras have a net effect of decimating civic agency. This is where Chamisa’s “God is in it” mantra, without any clear articulation of the way forward becomes dangerous, demoralizing and uninspiring. Even the most devout of Christians are now uninspired because they know that their God does not fail, and they also know what their Bible says about faith without action.

Oliver Reginald Kaizana Tambo took over the leadership of the ANC at a very crucial time of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. He was a devout Anglican pastor. Imagine him being asked how the ANC was going to lead South Africans to liberation and all he can say is “God has remembered South Africa. Help is on the way #God is in it!” Would South Africa have succeeded to dislodge the apartheid regime?

Ideological clarity

Historically, one of the biggest and fatal obstacles to Zimbabwe’s quest for democratic breakthrough is the absence of an opposition that is based on a clear pan African ideological grounding. The ideology which one chooses to adopt defines who becomes their allies. A struggle against autocracy cannot be achieved without the support of strategic allies, especially within the region. Strategic allies are individuals, groups, governments and political organisations who wield influence and power and are prepared to exert their influence and power in furtherance of the cause to end autocracy. For example, the SADC region is strategically important in resolving the Zimbabwean question. I certainly do not believe that SADC is a toothless organisation when it comes to resolving the Zimbabwean question. We owe our current Constitution and some of the progressive electoral reforms we now have to SADC’s intervention between 2006 and 2013. The challenge is that the Zimbabwean opposition in its current shape and form does not have strategic allies within the SADC region.

Though to a limited extent, under Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, the opposition succeeded to make some inroads in building allies within the SADC region. This was partly because the opposition under Morgan Tsvangirai identified itself as a labour movement, and thus was able to strike a code with powerful organisations such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and other labour unionists in the SADC region and across the world. Under Mr Chamisa, the ideological identity of the Zimbabwean opposition (CCC) is unclear and as a result, CCC is an isolated organisation both regionally and internationally. 

Indeed, governments in SADC are concerned about the immigration crisis, which is directly linked to the unresolved Zimbabwean crisis. However, the immigration crisis on its own is insufficient to persuade them to render their support to the opposition in Zimbabwe if they do not ideologically trust its leader. In 2008, Morgan Tsvangirai won the Presidential election, but SADC did not trust him. They rather facilitated a Government of National Unity, as a way of stabilizing the socio-economic situation while allowing ZANU PF to renew and reset itself. It appears that they would rather assist ZANU PF to renew itself and stabilize the economy rather than supporting the opposition to take over. They simply do not trust the opposition. In this context, the Zimbabwean opposition needs a leader who is ideologically grounded. Religion is not an ideology and is insufficient to enable an organisation to build the necessary alliances that are capable of exerting enough pressure and influence to facilitate a democratic breakthrough in Zimbabwe.

Embracing collective leadership

Authoritarian regimes can never be dismantled by one person no matter how brilliant, energetic or popular that person is. Alone, Nelson Mandela could never succeed to bring democracy to South Africa notwithstanding his popularity as a leader, both locally and internationally. Comandante Fidel Alejandro Castro of Cuba could not succeed on his own to bring down Batista’s dictatorship. These leaders, worked through and with other groups and that is what made it possible to achieve their political goals. In order to succeed in its quest for a democratic breakthrough, Zimbabwe needs an opposition leader who is capable of uniting people.

Under Mr Chamisa it is impossible to unite people from diverse backgrounds precisely because he has chosen to create a party which essentially functions like a cult. Mr Chamisa has consistently refused to institutionalize CCC. He runs his party through rallies, without any formal structures and without a constitution. He has not been elected by anyone into his position. Basically, he is not accountable to anyone except a group of few friends who hold their (informal) positions at his pleasure. He makes decisions based on what he believes he is hearing from God. These are signs of a leader who is not committed to democratic principles but may also be a religious fundamentalist. Of course, in both the 2018 and 2023 elections people voted for him because he was the only option they had outside of ZANU PF. Beyond attracting protest votes (courtesy of ZANU PF’s misrule), Mr Chamisa is unable to unite people because of his lack of commitment to democratic principles and his disdain for collective leadership.

Zimbabwean opposition is in need of a leader who is able to bring together various interest groups to the decision-making table. There is need for a leader who can work with and through others, including those whose views are divergent to his. There is a lesson we can learn about Nelson Mandela. When he was released from prison and he took over the leadership of the ANC, he had to work with Thabo Mbeki who had been the defacto assistant to President Oliver Tambo. Several biographers including Mark Gevisser and Pieter du Toit have reported that Thabo Mbeki was not Mandela’s favorite and the two held divergent views on several issues. However, Nelson Mandela did not only work with Thabo Mbeki in the ANC but also appointed him as his Deputy President upon winning the elections in 1994. This is because Thabo Mbeki was a strategist and an exceptional diplomat-the very skills which Mandela needed in order to succeed as a leader. There are several thought leaders whom Mr Chamisa has marginalized within CCC, simply because they hold views that are divergent to his.

Strategic thinker

Successful political campaigns require leadership which thinks strategically and long term. In the Zimbabwean context, the opposition is up against not only a vicious political system but one that is also manned by very shrewd operatives. They can be clumsy here and there, but they are always planning more than ten steps ahead of the opposition. Sensing Mr Chamisa’s gullibility, the Harare regime targeted him with false intelligence in order to give him false comfort in the lead up to the 2023 general election. False prophets were dispatched by the regime to assure Mr Chamisa that he did not have to do much as his victory was guaranteed by God. Political emissaries were also dispatched by the regime to create an impression to Mr Chamisa that the regime was in a panic mode and certain elements (within the regime) would protect his election victory. This partly explains why Mr Chamisa went into the 2023 election fully aware that it was never going to be a fair game, but he never had a counter-rigging plan and neither did he have a clear plan on how to respond if the election is stolen. After Mr Emmerson Mnangagwa was declared as the winner, it was very clear that Mr Chamisa was stunned and did not know how to respond other than to insist that his victory had been stolen even though “God is in it”.  A strategic thinker would never have participated in that election without a solid plan at least to gather evidence of election theft and a plan on how he would respond in the event that the election outcome is manipulated.

Against all manner of counsel, Mr Chamisa is still insisting on running his party alone without formal structures and without a constitution. He claims that he has secret structures whom he works with across the country. He calls these structures “wapusa wapusa”-a very strange name in the Zimbabwean context. Wapusa Wapusa is a religious cult which is notorious for conducting its worship services in the dark whilst congregants are naked and having sex orgies.  The literal meaning of wapusa in English is “stupid”! From a political marketing point of view, it is very unstrategic for Mr Chamisa to describe his party as “Wapusa Wapusa”, especially considering that he claims to have been anointed by God to lead Zimbabwe. Which God does Wapusa Wapusa worship?  But there is something even more unstrategic about running CCC using the Wapusa Wapusa model. Being a secretive party of unelected people, it means that anyone can claim to represent the party precisely because there are no known structures or rules and no one (including Chamisa himself) can claim to be the legitimate leader. His claim over the CCC throne is as good as anyone’s claim because he has not been elected or appointed by anyone. It will not surprise me if any random group of people organize a CCC congress and purport to elect a new leadership which then will claim to be the legitimate party leadership with the right to receive State funds under the Political Parties Finance Act. Do not say I did not warn you! Already, there is a Mr Sengezo Tshabangu who has written to Parliament purporting to recall some of the CCC legislators, claiming to be acting on behalf of CCC. It’s likely that this matter will end up in the courts of law. Should this happen, what will Mr Chamisa do given that he has taken a position that he will not be seeking the intervention of courts because they “are all captured”?

Conclusion

The struggle for democracy must be a struggle of the people rather than a struggle of one person. However, leadership matters. The quality of a leader the people have will determine whether they will succeed in their struggle or not. Zimbabwe needs an opposition leader who embraces collective leadership. Mr Chamisa believes he can dislodge ZANU PF alone because he is popular. Zimbabwe needs an opposition leader who is capable of leading the masses from the front and along a defined course of action. The way forward for the struggle is unclear under Mr Chamisa’s leadership. Zimbabwe needs an opposition leader who is ideologically grounded. Beyond what appears to be religious fanaticism, Mr Chamisa’s ideological identity is unclear. The struggle against ZANU PF autocracy requires a leader who is a strategic thinker. Mr Chamisa is a mere populist whose decisions are in many cases short sighted. Frantz Fanon said “Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it or betray it”. It is time that men and women of valor and wisdom rise up to the occasion and step up to the call of leadership, and hopefully when this happens Zimbabweans will be able to notice and render them their support, to overcome dictatorship, secure a democratic breakthrough and move the country towards a better future.

This article has been written by Justice Alfred Mavedzenge, in his personal capacity. He is a constitutional lawyer committed to the building of democracy in Zimbabwe and Africa.